192 A.3d 194
Pa. Super. Ct.2018Background
- William J. Lynn, former Secretary for Clergy for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, was charged (2011) with endangering the welfare of children and related conspiracy counts for negligent supervision of priests Edward Avery and James Brennan based on alleged sexual abuse of a minor, D.G.
- At the 2012 trial the Commonwealth presented D.G.’s testimony and broad "other-acts" evidence regarding abuse allegations against ~21 other priests; the jury convicted Lynn on one EWOC count (related to Avery) and he was sentenced to 3–6 years.
- This Court later vacated the conviction and ordered a new trial due to the trial court’s admission of overly prejudicial other-acts evidence.
- Before retrial, Lynn moved to dismiss and bar retrial under the Pennsylvania Double Jeopardy Clause, claiming after-discovered evidence: Detective Walsh had investigated inconsistencies in D.G.’s testimony and reported them to ADA Sorensen, who nevertheless allowed D.G. to testify—constituting Brady/prosecutorial misconduct or subornation of perjury.
- The trial court held the Commonwealth should have disclosed certain aspects of Walsh’s investigation but found no evidence the Commonwealth intentionally withheld information or knowingly presented false testimony; it ordered a new trial (already granted) instead of dismissal.
- The Superior Court affirmed, holding Lynn failed to prove intentional prosecutorial misconduct necessary to bar retrial under Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lynn) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutorial nondisclosure of Detective Walsh’s investigation constituted intentional Brady violation barring retrial | Commonwealth intentionally withheld exculpatory witness-preparation information and ADA Sorensen’s reactions, violating Brady and warranting dismissal | Commonwealth conceded Walsh was hired and some information was not disclosed but contends inconsistencies were disclosed and no intentional suppression occurred | No; trial court’s factual findings show no proof of intentional withholding, so dismissal under double jeopardy not warranted; retrial appropriate |
| Whether allowing D.G. to testify when prosecution knew (or should have known) his testimony was false amounts to intentional subornation of perjury barring retrial | Prosecutor knowingly presented false evidence or recklessly ignored truth, provoking denial of a fair trial so retrial must be barred | Commonwealth: inconsistencies did not prove testimony false; ADA Sorensen believed D.G.; credibility matters for jury | No; inconsistencies do not establish perjury or prosecutorial intent to present false evidence; jury should decide credibility |
| Whether writ of prohibition should issue to preclude D.G.’s testimony at retrial | Prophylactic writ needed because Commonwealth will introduce known false testimony, violating constitutional rights | Trial court has discretion over admissibility; ordinary remedies and appeals suffice | No; writ of prohibition is extraordinary and inappropriate because admissibility is within trial court’s discretion |
| Appropriate remedy for non-intentional Brady-type nondisclosure | Bar retrial as remedy for prosecutorial misconduct | New trial or other remedies suffice where nondisclosure was not intentional | New trial (already granted) is proper; double jeopardy bar requires intentional misconduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (retrial barred where prosecutor acts to deliberately provoke mistrial)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (Brady extends to evidence affecting witness credibility)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992) (Pennsylvania bars retrial not only for provoked mistrial but for prosecutorial conduct intentionally depriving defendant of a fair trial)
- Commonwealth v. Kearns, 70 A.3d 881 (Pa. Super. 2013) (double jeopardy requires intentional prosecutorial subversion; negligence insufficient)
- Commonwealth v. Burke, 781 A.2d 1136 (Pa. 2001) (miscommunication between police and prosecutor that causes nondisclosure does not by itself establish deliberate misconduct)
- Commonwealth v. Adams, 177 A.3d 359 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Brady violations may warrant dismissal but require showing of materiality and, for double jeopardy relief, intent)
- Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282 (Pa. 2010) (inconsistencies in testimony do not, alone, prove falsity; credibility is for the jury)