Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149

On Sept. 22, 2015 police observed a suspected heroin sale; Christopher Luketic (driver) was stopped and officers recovered eight stamp bags from the front passenger and a loaded syringe in the back seat. Luketic pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance (open plea) on June 1, 2016.
At co-defendant Buckner’s sentencing the judge stated in open court that Luketic “is going to jail, too,” and later, before hearing Luketic's mitigation, told counsel “I am going to send him to jail.”
Defense counsel objected repeatedly that the judge had predetermined sentence and asked for probation, house arrest, or treatment-based alternatives; defense presented mitigating facts about Luketic’s addiction, treatment attempts, employment, and parenting.
The court sentenced Luketic to 6–12 months’ incarceration and one year probation, despite the sentencing guidelines indicating a standard range from restorative sanctions (probation) to a minimum six-month jail term depending on prior record score.
Luketic appealed, claiming (1) the judge should have recused or explained why recusal was unnecessary after expressing a predisposition to incarcerate, and (2) the sentence was not individualized because the court predetermined incarceration and based its decision on a ‘‘two sides of the same coin’’ theory rather than the defendant’s character and rehabilitative needs.

Issue	Appellant's Argument	Commonwealth / Trial Court Argument	Held
Whether judge should have recused or explained impartiality after expressing predisposition	The judge’s repeated statements that Luketic "is going to jail" demonstrated bias; counsel’s objections preserved a recusal claim without needing the word "recuse"	Trial court: no explicit recusal motion was made; judge had no duty to infer one; issue waived	Waived — appellant failed to make a specific on-the-record recusal motion; claim not preserved for relief
Whether sentence was individualized or pre-determined (discretionary aspects)	The court predicated incarceration on non-individualized factors, announced the sentence before hearing mitigation, and relied on a ‘‘two-sides-of-the-same-coin’’ theory tying Luketic’s sentence to co-defendant Buckner’s sentence	Trial court: had a preconceived view but listened and found mitigators unpersuasive; sentence within guideline range (high end) and therefore appropriate	Vacated — court manifestly abused discretion by predetermining incarceration, relying on non-individualized rationale, and failing to rely on sufficient presentence information; remanded for resentencing

Druce v. Commonwealth, 848 A.2d 104 (Pa. 2004) (judge must analyze recusal motion on the record; party must make a specific recusal request)
Devers v. Commonwealth, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988) (sentencing judge must gather adequate information and explain how the sentence reflects statutory guidelines; individualized sentencing required)
Martin v. Commonwealth, 351 A.2d 650 (Pa. 1976) (vacating sentences where predetermined, uniform punishments ignored individualized sentencing)
Goggins v. Commonwealth, 748 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. 2000) (where no PSI, court must conduct sufficient presentence inquiry to learn defendant’s personal history)
Knighton v. Commonwealth, 415 A.2d 9 (Pa. 1980) (allocution is meaningless if sentence was pre-determined)
Coulverson v. Commonwealth, 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011) (vacating sentence that was not individualized and was based primarily on crime severity)
Mola v. Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 791 (Pa. Super. 2003) (standardized or one-size-fits-all sentences for drug offenders are an abuse of discretion)