Commonwealth v. Lukach, 163 A.3d 1003

Victim John Brock was found murdered; police recovered gloves, wallet contents, and a bank card near his home; Lukach and another were identified as persons of interest.
Police located Lukach the morning after the homicide; later that day Lukach’s mother consented to a home search yielding box cutters and white work gloves.
On August 7, 2015 Lukach was arrested on outstanding summary warrants, advised of Miranda rights, and interviewed by Chief Wojciechowsky.
During the interview Lukach said, “I don’t know, just, I’m done talking. I don’t have nothing to talk about,” but officers continued questioning for ~30 minutes and seized Lukach’s shoes; later the tape was stopped and the DA arrived.
After the break and further advisements, Lukach gave a detailed confession; police then recovered ATM footage and items (credit card, hat, shirt, sunglasses) from a storm drain.
The suppression court suppressed (1) statements made after Lukach said he was done talking, (2) Lukach’s shoes and evidence from them, and (3) items recovered from the storm drain; the Commonwealth appealed.

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Lukach's Argument	Held
Was Lukach’s statement an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent?	Lukach’s words were wavering, qualified, and ambiguous; not a clear invocation.	His statement (“I’m done talking…”) was an unambiguous invocation and officers had to stop.	Court: statement was a clear, unambiguous invocation; suppression court did not err.
Did continued questioning after the invocation violate the Fifth Amendment and require suppression of subsequent statements?	Even if there was continued questioning, Lukach later knowingly waived Miranda when re-advised before speaking to the DA.	Continued interrogation after invocation (same officer, same location, no pause) was coercive; any subsequent waiver was tainted.	Court: officers did not "scrupulously honor" the invocation; the post-invocation confession was tainted and inadmissible.
Were physical items seized after the tainted statements admissible as independent evidence (not fruit of the poisonous tree)?	A Miranda violation does not automatically vitiate non-testimonial physical evidence; the recovered items should be admissible.	The physical evidence was discovered because of the coerced statements and thus is fruit of the poisonous tree.	Court: evidence obtained from or after the illegal interrogation (shoes, storm-drain items) were fruits of the poisonous tree and properly suppressed.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (invocation of Miranda right must be affirmative, clear, and unambiguous)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (police must scrupulously honor a request to cut off questioning)
Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (belated warnings cannot cleanse prior coercive interrogation)
Commonwealth v. Henry, 599 A.2d 132 (Pa. Super. 1991) (adopting Mosley ‘‘scrupulously honor’’ test)
Commonwealth v. Russell, 938 A.2d 1082 (Pa. Super. 2007) (factors for evaluating whether invocation was honored: warnings, immediate cessation, time lapse/location/other officer)
Commonwealth v. Miller, 56 A.3d 1276 (Pa. Super. 2012) (standard of review on suppression appeals)
Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806 (Pa. Super. 2015) (fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis: whether subsequent evidence was purged of primary taint)