Commonwealth v. Livingstone v. Aplt.
11 WAP 2016
Pa.Nov 27, 2017Background
- Trooper Franz stopped alongside Victoria Livingstone’s parked car on I-79 with emergency lights activated, effecting an investigative detention.
- Franz conceded he lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he detained Livingstone and testified his motive was to render assistance.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a warrantless seizure of a motorist can be justified by a “public servant” or community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment.
- The Majority recognized a limited public servant exception but required: (1) specific, objective, articulable facts suggesting assistance was needed; (2) police action independent from criminal investigation; and (3) that the action be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating peril.
- Justice Donohue (concurring/dissenting) agreed with recognizing an exception but argued it must adhere strictly to Cady’s requirement that caretaking be “totally divorced” from law enforcement motives; he objected to the Majority’s weaker “independent from” language.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a police stop of a parked motorist with lights on is a seizure | Commonwealth: stop was an investigative detention justified under public servant exception | Livingstone: detention was unconstitutional absent reasonable suspicion or warrant | Court: seizure occurred; recognized a limited public servant exception but set strict criteria to justify it |
| Whether Cady supports a broad community-caretaking exception for detaining motorists | Commonwealth: Cady supports caretaking rationale for warrantless police actions | Livingstone: Cady is limited to inventory searches and requires standardized procedures and being divorced from investigations | Court/Donohue: Cady supports a caretaking rationale, but Donohue insists Cady requires the caretaking purpose be totally divorced from law-enforcement aims |
| Standard for assessing officer motivation (subjective vs objective) | Commonwealth/Majority: objective reasonableness controls; subjective motivation irrelevant if objectively justified | Livingstone/Donohue: subjective mixed motives should defeat caretaking justification absent exigency; require pure caretaking purpose | Court: Majority applies objective test; Donohue dissents on allowing any commingling of motives |
| Scope and safeguards for exception to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement | Commonwealth: three-prong test (articulable facts, independent from investigation, tailored response) limits intrusion | Livingstone: test insufficiently protective; risk of validating investigations masked as caretaking | Court: adopted three-prong test; Donohue would tighten it to require being "totally divorced" from investigative purpose |
Key Cases Cited
- Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (recognized police community-caretaking functions and validated warrantless inventory search of impounded vehicle)
- Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (officer entry without warrant reasonable when exigent circumstances threaten safety; objective circumstances control)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (validated brief, suspicion-based seizures and limited protective searches for officer safety)
- Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (discussed warrant requirement and exigent-circumstances exception under Fourth Amendment)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (officer subjective intent generally irrelevant where objective legal justification exists)