Commonwealth v. Letkowski
83 Mass. App. Ct. 847
| Mass. App. Ct. | 2013Background
- Early April 18, 2006: college student reported being forced into her car at knifepoint, driven, robbed, and sexually assaulted; attacker wore a black ski mask.
- Later that morning a Longmeadow officer stopped a silver PT Cruiser after a 911 report; defendant was driver, appeared to shift items, had facial injuries, and produced a black ski mask when asked what he was sitting on.
- Officers seized the ski mask and a nine-inch knife (defendant consented and was not arrested at that time).
- Springfield police matched fingerprints from the victim’s car to the defendant, obtained an arrest warrant, arrested him the next day, advised him of Miranda rights, and he initially invoked his right to remain silent and to counsel.
- After booking and receipt of pain medication, defendant consented to an oral DNA swab and shortly thereafter waived and gave a statement admitting an attack but denying sexual assault and use of a knife; he was convicted by jury of multiple offenses.
- On appeal defendant challenged suppression of evidence and statements, alleged Edwards/Doyle violations, contested first-complaint and DNA evidence admissibility, and claimed duplicative convictions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legality of stop/vehicle search and seizure of ski mask & knife | Stop lawful; exit order and search for weapons justified by furtive movement, matching description, and injuries | Seizure of ski mask and search unlawful; ski mask not contraband and its incriminating nature not apparent | Affirmed: stop, exit order, voluntary surrender of mask/knife, and search valid |
| Post-arrest statement after initial Miranda invocation (Edwards) | Police request for DNA swab akin to consent to search and did not reinitiate interrogation; defendant later initiated conversation | Officer-initiated interrogation by seeking DNA was functional equivalent of reinitiation after invocation | Affirmed: no Edwards violation; defendant initiated further conversation and consent request not custodial interrogation |
| Prosecutor’s references to defendant’s initial silence (Doyle) | References relevant to voluntariness and humane practice; judge instructed jury on voluntariness | References improperly used defendant’s post-Miranda silence against him | Mixed: brief references should not have been made, but no substantial miscarriage of justice given context, instruction, weight of evidence, and lack of objection |
| Admissibility of DNA and first-complaint evidence | DNA match admissible; first-complaint testimony admissible as not foreclosed by defense; voluntariness still contested | DNA testimony violated confrontation clause; first-complaint improper because defendant’s sole defense was lack of criminal responsibility | Affirmed: DNA testimony did not violate confrontation; first-complaint admissible under facts; convictions otherwise stand but some convictions duplicative and remanded for dismissal decisions |
Key Cases Cited
- Santana v. Commonwealth, 420 Mass. 205 (stop of vehicle lawful)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (prohibition on reinitiating interrogation after invocation of counsel)
- Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (post-Miranda silence generally may not be used as evidence of guilt)
- LeClair v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 734 (defendant may initiate further conversation after invoking rights; Massachusetts follows federal Edwards/Bradshaw law)
- Connolly v. Commonwealth, 454 Mass. 808 (test for whether misuse of silence creates substantial risk of miscarriage of justice)
- Greineder v. Commonwealth, 464 Mass. 580 (expert opinion relying on nontestifying analyst’s DNA results does not violate Confrontation Clause)
- Toolan v. Commonwealth, 460 Mass. 452 (humane practice rule and admissibility of Miranda evidence when voluntariness is contested)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (officer safety justifies limited vehicle/stop searches)