58 N.E.3d 343
Mass. App. Ct.2016Background
- On Nov. 30, 2012, teens (including 16‑ and 17‑year‑olds) drank alcohol at Mark and Julie Leonard’s home; defendants and teens consumed alcohol and Mark smoked marijuana with family members.
- A 16‑year‑old guest (“Susan”) became extremely ill and vomited; she stayed overnight and asked Julie (a nurse) to take her to a hospital, but Julie declined.
- The next morning Susan was still vomiting; Julie told her she had medicine from her nursing‑home employer and used a syringe to inject an unknown liquid; Susan reported feeling better after the injection.
- Police interviewed Mark and Julie; Mark made statements suggesting awareness of Susan’s intoxication and concern about Julie’s job; Julie refused to come to the station without counsel; Mark consented to a home search.
- Criminal complaints charged Julie with assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (syringe), and both defendants with reckless endangerment of a child and related counts; the District Court dismissed the dangerous‑weapon assault count against Julie and dismissed the reckless‑endangerment counts against both defendants for lack of probable cause.
- The Appeals Court reviewed the complaints on a probable‑cause standard and concluded the complaints supplied probable cause to reinstate the reckless‑endangerment counts and the assault‑by‑dangerous‑weapon count as to the assault/attempted battery theory (but found the dangerous‑weapon element supported as applied to the syringe in the circumstances).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether complaint shows probable cause for assault & battery by means of a dangerous weapon (syringe) | Complaint alleges nonconsensual injection of unknown nursing‑home drug into an intoxicated minor; syringe used in a dangerous fashion → weapon element and assault shown | Julie contends victim consented and syringe is not a dangerous weapon per se; trial required to resolve consent and harm | Probable cause exists for assault (attempted battery theory) and for syringe as dangerous in fact given circumstances; complaint reinstated |
| Whether victim’s consent negates assault charge | Commonwealth: consent immaterial where touching is harmful or dangerous weapon used | Defendants: victim consented; intoxication undermines capacity to prosecute | Consent is immaterial to dangerous‑weapon assault; factual capacity/consent issues reserved for trial |
| Whether complaint shows probable cause for reckless endangerment of a child (G. L. c. 265, § 13L) | Allegations that defendants supplied/allowed underage drinking, knew of severe vomiting, and failed to seek medical care create wanton/reckless conduct and substantial risk of serious bodily injury | Defendants argued no actual serious bodily injury and no substantial risk shown as matter of law | Probable cause exists: alleged awareness and conduct support wanton/reckless mens rea; vomiting/aspiration/dehydration present a substantial risk of serious bodily injury |
| Standard for review of motion to dismiss complaint for lack of probable cause | Commonwealth: four‑corners review; facts must be viewed favorably to Commonwealth; probable cause is less than conviction evidence | Defendants: challenged sufficiency of factual allegations to establish elements | Court applied four‑corners probable‑cause standard and found complaints sufficient to proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296 (discusses elements of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon)
- Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367 Mass. 411 (distinguishes weapons dangerous per se from instruments dangerous in fact)
- Commonwealth v. Marrero, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 921 (use, handling, and surrounding circumstances inform whether an object is dangerous in fact)
- Commonwealth v. Burke, 390 Mass. 480 (consent immaterial where touching is physically harmful or dangerous weapon used)
- Commonwealth v. Melton, 436 Mass. 291 (elements of attempted battery)
- Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 473 Mass. 665 (§ 13L requires subjective awareness and conscious disregard; defines substantial risk standard)
- Commonwealth v. Chapman, 433 Mass. 481 (interpretation of protracted or substantial bodily injury relevant to § 13L)