Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1

Charles Lawson was convicted of third-degree murder in 1992 for an offense committed at age 33 and was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9715 based on a prior third‑degree murder conviction from 1978 when he was 17.
Lawson filed multiple PCRA petitions: first (1996) dismissed on ineffectiveness grounds; second (2004) dismissed as untimely; third filed August 20, 2012, which the PCRA court dismissed without a hearing.
Lawson appealed, arguing (1) the PCRA court failed to provide Rule 907 notice before summary dismissal and (2) Miller v. Alabama required relief because his mandatory life sentence under § 9715 relied in part on juvenile conduct.
The Superior Court confirmed Lawson’s judgment of sentence became final in 1993 and held his 2012 PCRA petition was untimely under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
The court rejected Lawson’s attempt to invoke the PCRA timeliness exception for newly recognized retroactive constitutional rights because (a) the U.S. Supreme Court has not held Miller retroactive on collateral review and (b) Miller applies only to juvenile offenders at the time of the offense; Lawson was an adult for the instant murder.
The court held § 9715 enhanced only the adult offense and did not increase punishment for the prior juvenile conviction; thus Miller did not invalidate Lawson’s mandatory life sentence imposed for the adult murder.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the PCRA court’s summary dismissal without Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice was error	Lawson: court failed to give Rule 907 notice before dismissal; reversal required	Commonwealth: dismissal was proper because petition was untimely and failure to give notice to untimely petition is not reversible error	Court: Rule 907 omission not reversible where petition is untimely; no relief granted
Whether Miller v. Alabama requires relief where § 9715 mandates life based in part on prior juvenile murder	Lawson: Miller’s Eighth Amendment rule bars mandatory life w/o parole based on use of prior juvenile conduct as predicate; sentencing court must consider juvenile mitigation for prior offense	Commonwealth: Miller applies only to those who were juveniles at time of the offense prompting the life term; Miller not held retroactive by U.S. Supreme Court; § 9715 enhances punishment for the adult offense, not the prior juvenile conviction	Court: Petition untimely and Miller is inapplicable—Miller not retroactive on collateral review per state precedent and does not extend to an adult’s life sentence enhanced by juvenile prior; § 9715 applied to adult offense only

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (holding mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide violates Eighth Amendment without individualized sentencing consideration)
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2013) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Miller does not apply retroactively on collateral review)
United States v. Hoffman, 710 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding Miller does not prevent mandatory life for adult whose sentence is enhanced by prior juvenile adjudication)
United States v. Orona, 724 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 2013) (same; juvenile adjudication as predicate does not invoke Miller protections for later adult sentence)
United States v. Hunter, 735 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2013) (Miller inapplicable where punishment is for an adult offense; sentence enhancements do not constitute punishment for prior convictions)
Commonwealth v. Scott, 497 A.2d 656 (Pa.Super. 1985) (holding § 9715 enhancement targets the current crime, not prior convictions for ex post facto purposes)
Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911 (Pa. 2000) (failure to give Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice alone is not reversible error when petition is untimely)