Commonwealth v. Lang
473 Mass. 1
| Mass. | 2015Background
- In 2006 Francis Lang was convicted of first‑degree murder (extreme atrocity or cruelty) for stabbing a bar patron; conviction affirmed after trial and posttrial proceedings.
- During jury empanelment the defendant’s family was asked to leave because seats were reserved for prospective jurors; no contemporaneous objection by trial counsel.
- Trial counsel pursued a self‑defense theory; he did not investigate the defendant’s psychiatric history or consult a mental‑health expert, although predecessor counsel had sought screening funds and the defendant disclosed a psychiatric history.
- Postconviction, the defendant moved for a new trial alleging (1) violation of the public‑trial right during jury selection and (2) ineffective assistance for failing to investigate/present a lack‑of‑criminal‑responsibility defense; both claims were litigated in evidentiary hearings and denied.
- Two separate concurring opinions explained the Court’s unanimous affirmance: all Justices reject the public‑trial and jury‑instruction challenges; Justices Hines and Duffly find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to investigate (strategy not manifestly unreasonable); Justices Lenk, Gants, and Cordy find no prejudice because defendant would not have agreed to an insanity defense and the defense likely would not have changed the outcome.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public‑trial closure during jury empanelment | Courtroom was effectively closed when family was excluded; violated Sixth Amendment right to public trial | Exclusion was routine, de minimis, and waived by experienced trial counsel’s failure to object | Waiver/no constitutional error; exclusion was trivial and counsel’s failure to object amounted to waiver under controlling precedent |
| Jury instruction on malice (extreme atrocity/cruelty) | Third‑prong malice is indistinguishable from involuntary manslaughter mens rea; should be abrogated | Existing three‑prong common‑law definition is correct and distinct | Instruction upheld; three prongs valid and third prong requires higher risk (plain and strong likelihood of death) than involuntary manslaughter |
| Ineffective assistance — failure to investigate psychiatric history | Counsel failed to investigate known psychiatric history, triggering duty to screen for lack of criminal responsibility | Counsel reasonably prioritized self‑defense as viable strategy and lawfully declined an insanity defense as tactical choice | No relief: court finds counsel’s failure to investigate problematic but, on these facts, strategic choice to pursue self‑defense was not manifestly unreasonable (Hines/Duffly); alternative concurrence relies on lack of evidence defendant would have chosen insanity defense and lack of prejudice (Lenk/Gants/Cordy) |
| Prejudice / §33E review (whether error likely changed outcome) | Failure to investigate/present insanity defense likely affected verdict | Evidence against defendant strong; self‑defense was viable; defendant would not have chosen insanity defense | No substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice; §33E review affirms conviction and denial of new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (four‑part test for closure of proceedings)
- Commonwealth v. Morganti, 467 Mass. 96 (2014) (public‑trial right includes jury selection; waiver implications)
- Commonwealth v. Alebord, 467 Mass. 106 (2014) (waiver of public‑trial right by counsel who does not object to routine empanelment exclusions)
- Commonwealth v. Riley, 467 Mass. 799 (2014) (definition and prongs of malice for extreme atrocity/cruelty)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (standard for assessing counsel performance and prejudice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (effective assistance framework; reasonableness and prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678 (1992) (§33E standard for reviewing ineffective‑assistance claims in first‑degree murder convictions)
- Commonwealth v. Federici, 427 Mass. 740 (1998) (defendant’s right to forgo insanity instruction)
