Commonwealth v. Lally
46 N.E.3d 41
Mass.2016Background
- December 19, 2001: Thomas Lally killed an 84‑year‑old woman (victim) by blunt force and suffocation, then staged the death as a fall down stairs; Lally, co‑resident Anthony Calabro, and Jason Weir were present. Weir later cooperated with authorities.
- Weir (then 16) testified that Lally struck and suffocated the victim; Weir helped move the body briefly and later guided police to items disposed of in a pond.
- Forensic testing: male DNA recovered from the victim’s fingernail scrapings/clippings — Lally could not be excluded; Weir and Anthony were excluded on key samples. One swab was contaminated at the crime lab.
- At trial Lally was convicted of first‑degree murder (premeditation and extreme atrocity); postconviction motion for new trial raised evidentiary and ineffective‑assistance claims.
- Motion judge denied the new‑trial motion after an evidentiary hearing; the SJC affirmed, reviewing under G. L. c. 278, § 33E and applicable ineffective‑assistance standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Lally) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of PCR non‑exclusion DNA without statistics | PCR non‑exclusion was admissible and any tactical choice by defense waived objection; stats could have been provided if challenged | PCR non‑exclusion required accompanying statistics per Mattei; admission was error and counsel ineffective for not objecting | Admission of PCR non‑exclusion without statistics was erroneous, but error was harmless given other evidence; counsel not ineffective under the circumstances |
| Admission of Y‑STR results using count method without confidence interval | Count method was a reliable, accepted method at trial time and provided proper context | Y‑STR should have been reported with a confidence interval; admission prejudicial | Y‑STR admission was permissible; count evidence provided sufficient context (court encourages confidence intervals going forward) |
| Prosecutor’s statements about DNA in opening/closing | Statements summarized evidence; no reversible misconduct absent timely objection | Prosecutor misstated strength of DNA (equating non‑exclusion with a match), prejudicing jury | Prosecutor misstated evidence, but error did not require reversal given lack of objection, jury instructions, and that DNA was not central to the case |
| Admission/playing of Weir’s audiotaped prior consistent statements | Tapes were admissible for impeachment and credibility; trial counsel strategically used them | Playing tapes bolstered Weir and was a counsel error | Counsel’s tactical choice to play full tapes for impeachment was not manifestly unreasonable; admission did not warrant relief |
| Failure to redact plea agreement references to ‘‘truthful’’ | Any extra references were cumulative of allowed reference and judge instructed jury on credibility | Unredacted references were extraneous and violated fairness; counsel ineffective | Failure to redact was error but harmless: references cumulative and judge’s instructions mitigated prejudice |
| Other alleged bad‑act evidence and counsel advising defendant to testify / not calling surrebuttal witnesses | Evidence and testimony were strategic choices by defense; defendant properly advised and decision to testify was reasonable | Bad‑act evidence and advice to testify (and failure to call two friends) were ineffective assistance | Admission of some bad‑act testimony was permissible or harmless; counsel’s advice to testify and decisions on witnesses were not manifestly unreasonable; no new trial granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840 (2010) (non‑exclusion DNA results require reliable statistical context to convey significance)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (standard for ineffective assistance claims: counsel’s conduct must not fall measurably below that of an ordinary, fallible lawyer)
- Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678 (1992) (§ 33E review nuances for unpreserved ineffective‑assistance claims)
- Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109 (1977) (filing a motion may be effective if it might accomplish something material for the defense)
- Commonwealth v. Curnin, 409 Mass. 218 (1991) (earlier requirement that DNA match testimony be accompanied by likelihood evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Evans, 469 Mass. 834 (2014) (application of Mattei principles to Y‑STR testing)