Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 471 Mass. 664

Defendant Enez Kolenovic stabbed and killed David Walker after an earlier bar altercation; convicted of first‑degree murder (extreme atrocity/cruelty) in 1999; jury acquitted on deliberate premeditation theory.
At trial defendant advanced an intoxication defense supported by a retained psychiatrist (Dr. Fox) and witnesses describing heavy drinking; Dr. Fox estimated BAC .26–.30 and testified to severe impairment from alcohol.
Pretrial Dr. Fox also suggested a dual diagnosis including PTSD and recommended further PTSD testing; trial counsel limited presentation to intoxication and declined further PTSD investigation for strategic reasons (fear of jury rejection of insanity defense and exposure to Commonwealth experts).
Posttrial experts (retained after conviction) diagnosed PTSD and other neuropsychiatric disorders and opined the defendant lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the killing.
The trial judge (who later heard the motion) granted the defendant’s Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 motion for a new trial, finding counsel’s decision not to pursue further mental‑health investigation was ineffective assistance; Commonwealth appealed to the SJC.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth)	Defendant's Argument (Kolenovic)	Held
Whether counsel’s failure to pursue further psychiatric testing and to present a PTSD/criminal‑responsibility defense was constitutionally ineffective (performance/misstated strategy)	Counsel’s strategic choice to rely on an intoxication defense was reasonable, informed, and not manifestly unreasonable; no duty to exhaustively investigate posttrial diagnoses	Counsel argued trial counsel performed measurably below standard by failing to investigate and present PTSD/other mental‑disease defenses that could have supplied an available, substantial defense	Court reversed: counsel’s decision was a reasonable, informed strategic choice and not manifestly unreasonable, so no ineffective assistance on the performance prong
Standard of review for granting a new trial on ineffective assistance grounds	Defer to trial judge’s factual findings but correct legal error and review whether judge abused discretion by misapplying the manifestly unreasonable test	Trial judge erred by relying on posttrial evidence and hindsight to require further investigation; must judge counsel’s decisions by information available at the time	Held that appellate court gives special deference to trial judge’s findings but may reverse where judge misapplied legal standard; here judge erred and abused discretion in ordering new trial

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974) (defines test for ineffective assistance based on performance and loss of available substantial defense)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (constitutional standard: reasonableness of counsel’s performance judged objectively; avoid hindsight)
Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213 (2005) (review of counsel’s duty to investigate mental‑health defenses; counsel’s choices measured against information known at the time)
Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836 (2011) (deference to counsel’s strategic decisions; counsel ‘‘knows best’’ how to present defense)
Commonwealth v. Candelario, 446 Mass. 847 (2006) (trial counsel may reasonably decline to present insanity defense despite expert diagnosis when strategy supports alternative defenses)
L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 (2014) (abuse of discretion standard clarified; appellate court may correct legal error in trial judge’s decision)
Commonwealth v. Lane, 462 Mass. 591 (2012) (appellate review of new‑trial orders asks whether trial judge committed significant error of law or abused discretion)