Commonwealth v. Kelly
134 A.3d 59
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- Kelly and Fuller went to Murray’s apartment intending to assault and rob him; Kelly shot Murray’s girlfriend, Finney, who was seven months pregnant; both Finney and the unborn child died.
- Fuller cooperated with police, pleaded guilty, and testified for the Commonwealth; he also led police to the gun.
- At voir dire, three prospective jurors (Nos. 1, 14, 22) gave answers raising neutrality concerns; the trial court denied defense challenges for cause to each.
- Kelly used peremptory strikes to remove some of these jurors and exhausted all peremptory challenges before the jury was empaneled.
- A jury convicted Kelly of second-degree murder (adult and unborn child) and conspiracy; the court imposed consecutive life sentences plus 8–20 years.
- On appeal Kelly argued, inter alia, that denial of challenges for cause forced him to expend peremptory strikes and deprived him of a fair jury; the appellate court vacated and remanded for a new trial based on Juror No. 1.
Issues
| Issue | Kelly's Argument | Commonwealth/Trial Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying challenges for cause to prospective jurors | Jurors Nos. 1, 14, 22 indicated partiality; denial forced Kelly to use peremptory strikes and exhausted them, warranting a new trial | Trial court found jurors credible and able to follow law; officer status alone does not require exclusion | Reversed and remanded: denial to remove Juror No. 1 was reversible error because juror had a “real relationship” creating presumed prejudice |
| Whether the erroneous denial was harmless because juror was later removed by peremptory strike | Error is harmless only if defendant did not exhaust peremptories; Kelly exhausted his strikes so harm is reversible | Commonwealth implicitly/explicitly opposed removal at trial; trial court applied standard deference | Not harmless — exhaustion of peremptory strikes made error reversible |
| Whether Juror No. 1’s status as a police officer required automatic disqualification | Kelly: ongoing, expected future working relationship with Beaver County DA and acquaintance with potential police witnesses created presumed bias | Commonwealth/Trial Court: officer testified he could be fair; no personal relationship to witnesses or exclusive same-department ties; discretion favored seating him | Court held a “real relationship” existed (ongoing prosecution relationship + knowing several witnesses) so prejudice was presumed |
| Need to address jurors 14 and 22 and weight-of-evidence claim | Kelly argued additional jurors showed bias and asked for new trial; also challenged verdict as against weight of evidence | Court deemed Juror No. 1 error sufficient; did not decide other juror or weight issues | Appellate court declined to reach jurors 14/22 and weight claim because remand for new trial required by Juror No. 1 error |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Ingber, 531 A.2d 1101 (Pa. 1986) (wrongful refusal of challenge for cause harmless only if peremptory challenges remain)
- Commonwealth v. Ellison, 902 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2006) (voir dire’s purpose is to secure an impartial jury)
- Commonwealth v. Colon, 299 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1972) (challenges for cause when close familial/financial/situational relationships create presumed prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Jones, 383 A.2d 874 (Pa. 1978) (police officer juror not automatically disqualified; ‘‘real relationship’’ to case requires exclusion)
- Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 369 A.2d 307 (Pa.Super. 1976) (reversible error where police juror had close ties to testifying officers and prosecutor)
- Commonwealth v. Impellizzeri, 661 A.2d 422 (Pa.Super. 1995) (deferential review of trial court’s voir dire credibility assessments)
- Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795 (Pa.Super. 2003) (standard for weight-of-the-evidence claims)