Background

• After a jury-waived trial in the District Court, the defendant was convicted of failing to verify his sex offender registration information by refusing to provide secondary addresses, and was sentenced to lifetime parole; the Appeals Court affirmed in an unpublished memorandum and order; the Supreme Judicial Court granted review; the court reverses on insufficiency of evidence, with mootness of other issues; briefly addresses whether the complaint properly alleged CPSL exposure.
• Defendant is a level two sex offender previously convicted in Oregon; he signed a registration form in 2006 acknowledging duty to register and later gave conflicting information about residence; police investigated the defendant’s address in 2007, including an assertion that he lived at 167 Newbury Street and that he stayed elsewhere; the detective attempted to verify addresses and obtained limited corroboration of the defendant’s residence; in July 2007 the defendant submitted forms and a letter indicating movement to Oregon; the State charged him with failing to register and to verify information, and sought CPSL under G. L. c. 6, § 178H (a).
• The trial judge found the defendant knowingly failed to verify registration information on June 18 and July 17, 2007, even though the defendant lived at the Brockton apartment and did not report other residences; the judge rejected allegations that the defendant provided false information to the board; the defendant testified that he stayed with his daughter and friend, but the evidence did not establish a second address meeting statutory thresholds; the Commonwealth presented no other witnesses to corroborate a secondary address; the defendant was arrested in 2008 for failure to register.
• The court discusses the statutory framework: three levels of offenders, annual in-person verification for levels two/three, and the definition of secondary addresses; CPSL is an enhanced penalty for certain offenses or classifications; the complaint language tracks §178H(a) but does not explicitly allege the predicate level or like offenses; the court finds art. 12 requires alleging and proving the predicate for CPSL; the complaint failed to meet those requirements.
• The court notes that there was no explicit finding of fact before imposing CPSL, and whether the complaint adequately alleged the predicate under Pagan is central to the due process analysis; the court ultimately reverses the conviction due to insufficient evidence and art. 12 deficiencies, leaving the CPSL issue moot.

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Commonwealth v. Rosado, 450 Mass. 657 (Mass. 2008) (classification level and verification duties for sex offenders)
• Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161 (Mass. 2005) (art. 12 enhancement for CPSL discussed)
• Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 430 Mass. 517 (Mass. 1999) (repeat-offender indictments; sufficiency of charging language)
• Commonwealth v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422 (Mass. 2003) (CPSL as enhanced penalty for sex offenders)
• Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (due process requirements for factual predicates increasing penalty)
• Commonwealth v. Armand, 411 Mass. 167 (Mass. 1991) (avoidance of speculation; cannot rely on conjecture for proofs)