Commonwealth v. Karash, 175 A.3d 306

Frederick W. Karash was summarily convicted and fined for failing to stop at a stop sign under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(b).
The statute begins with a prefatory clause: "Except when directed to proceed by a police officer or appropriately attired persons..." before describing the stop-sign duties.
The trial court treated the prefatory clause as a defense the defendant must prove, relying on other Superior Court panels and the reasoning in Commonwealth v. Williams.
Karash argued (and the Superior Court panel in this opinion agreed) that the Commonwealth must disprove the exception — i.e., prove no officer directed him to proceed — as part of its case-in-chief.
The Commonwealth did not elicit testimony addressing whether an officer was directing traffic; the court held this omission fatal.
The Superior Court reversed the conviction and discharged Karash, following the controlling precedent of Commonwealth v. Banellis.

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Karash's Argument	Held
Whether the prefatory "except when directed to proceed by a police officer" clause in § 3323(b) is an element the Commonwealth must disprove or a defense the defendant must prove	The clause is a proviso/defense; treating it as an element imposes an absurd burden on the Commonwealth	The clause is integrated into the definition of the offense; Commonwealth must prove absence of officer direction	Held for Karash: the clause is an element of the offense; Commonwealth must negate it in its case-in-chief (Banellis controls)
Whether Commonwealth v. Williams overruled Banellis and controls interpretation	Williams purportedly rejected Banellis and treats similar language as an affirmative defense	Banellis directly interprets § 3323(b) and is controlling; Williams is distinguishable and largely dicta on § 3323	Held: Williams does not overrule Banellis; Williams addressed a different statute and its remark was dicta — Banellis remains controlling

Commonwealth v. Banellis, 682 A.2d 383 (Pa. Super. 1996) (held the "except when directed" clause in § 3323(b) is an element the Commonwealth must negate)
Commonwealth v. Williams, 872 A.2d 186 (Pa. Super. 2005) (addressed "unless otherwise directed" language in a different statute; court called that language an affirmative defense)
Commonwealth v. McNeil, 337 A.2d 840 (Pa. 1975) (statutory structure can make absence of a permissive state an essential element)
Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 399 A.2d 392 (Pa. 1979) (distinguished provisos from integrated except‑clauses; "unless" often signals a proviso)
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 565 A.2d 437 (Pa. 1989) (clarified when exception language is part of the offense versus a proviso/defense)