Commonwealth v. Kakhankham
132 A.3d 986
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Victim was found dead from a heroin overdose; coroner reported morphine level of 295 ng/ml (therapeutic ~10 ng/ml). 8 heroin packets (two used, six unused) stamped “Blackout” were at the scene.
- Multiple witnesses stated Appellant (Somwang Laos Kakhankham) supplied the victim heroin; one witness conducted a controlled buy from Appellant and official funds used were later found among Appellant’s cash.
- Appellant was charged with drug delivery resulting in death (18 Pa.C.S. § 2506) and possession with intent to deliver; he stipulated the factual record at trial.
- Appellant sought dismissal via habeas corpus and later argued § 2506 is unconstitutionally vague as to mens rea and causation, and that Commonwealth failed to make a prima facie case as to the death element.
- Trial court denied habeas relief; following a stipulated-record trial Appellant was convicted under § 2506 and sentenced to 78–156 months’ imprisonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Kakhankham) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2506 is unconstitutionally vague generally or as applied | § 2506 clearly prohibits intentionally providing controlled substances that result in death; statute understandable and not encouraging arbitrary enforcement | Statute vague: unclear mens rea for death element and unclear causation standard, risking arbitrary enforcement | Court: § 2506 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; statute clear for defendant’s conduct |
| Whether mens rea for the delivery element is defined | The word "intentionally" in § 2506 and § 302(b)(1) supply required mens rea for the delivery conduct | Argues statute fails to indicate requisite mental state for offense | Court: delivery element requires intent; statutory definitions supply the mens rea |
| Whether mens rea (or absolute liability) applies to the death/result element | Commonwealth: causation governed by § 303 but mens rea for result is supplied by § 302(c) (intentional, knowing, or reckless) where legislature did not plainly impose absolute liability | Defendant: § 2506 could be read to impose intentional mens rea on the death element or none at all (absolute liability) | Court: No plain legislative intent for absolute liability; apply § 302(c); death must be at least reckless |
| Whether Commonwealth established prima facie causation at preliminary hearing | Evidence (stipulation, witness statements, controlled buy, recovered money, coroner’s report) supports but-for causation and foreseeability | Argues no evidence the heroin was sole or primary cause | Court: defendant stipulated heroin caused death; but-for test and foreseeability satisfied; any preliminary hearing defects cured by trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d 244 (Pa. 1976) (vagueness challenges examined in light of facts at hand)
- Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 752 A.2d 384 (Pa. 2000) (standard of review for statute constitutionality; presumption of constitutionality)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (void-for-vagueness test: definiteness and non-arbitrary enforcement)
- Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 832 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2003) (statute not vague where ordinary people can understand prohibited conduct)
- Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 874 A.2d 623 (Pa. 2005) (analysis of vagueness and statutory interpretation principles)
- Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (U.S. 2014) ("results from" language read to require but-for causation absent contrary text)
- Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756 (Pa. Super. 2008) (criminal causation: result must not be extraordinarily remote; direct and substantial factor standard)
- Minn. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 805 A.2d 622 (Pa. Super. 2002) (heroin distribution foreseeably dangerous; overdose risk foreseeable)