Commonwealth v. Jaynes
135 A.3d 606
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 15, 2011 Nathaniel Harley was robbed at gunpoint; shortly after he entered a police cruiser and saw a photograph of Jaynes on the cruiser computer and immediately said it was his assailant.
- The photograph had been on the cruiser inadvertently from an unrelated police matter; Officer Kostick stated it was not displayed intentionally for identification.
- Detective Mullen thereafter conducted an eight-photo array that included Jaynes; Harley immediately identified Jaynes from that array and said he was "100 percent" sure and recognized Jaynes from the neighborhood.
- Jaynes was tried twice (first trial ended in partial hung jury); after retrial a jury convicted Jaynes of robbery, PIC, and person not to possess a firearm; aggregate sentence 17–35 years.
- Jaynes appealed, arguing: (1) trial court erred by denying suppression of in- and out-of-court identifications as tainted by a suggestive single-photo display; (2) trial court improperly curtailed cross-examination about photo-array protocols; and (3) prosecutor’s closing argument warranted mistrial for asking jurors to "put themselves in the victim’s shoes."
- The Superior Court affirmed: it found the initial photo display was accidental (not improper police conduct) and Harley’s identification reliable; cross-examination claim was waived for failure to object; prosecutor’s comment, viewed in context, did not amount to reversible misconduct.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suppression of in-/out-of-court IDs | Single-photo on cruiser was unduly suggestive and tainted later array and in-court ID | Photo shown accidentally; subsequent array and in-court ID reliable and independent | Denied — no improper police conduct; identification reliable under totality of circumstances |
| Comment by officer about prior "run-in" | Officer Kostick’s remark further tainted identification | Harley knew Jaynes from neighborhood; remark did not create substantial likelihood of misidentification | Denied — no substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification |
| Limitation on cross-examination of Detective Mullen | Court improperly interrupted and limited questioning about police photo-array protocols | Defense failed to object at trial; issue waived on appeal | Waived — no relief due to lack of timely objection |
| Prosecutor’s closing argument ("put yourselves in the victim’s shoes") | Comment appealed to jury sympathy and warranted mistrial | Comment explained victim’s fear and threats and was responsive to defense; not outcome-determinative | Denied — remark, read in context, did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or deprive defendant of fair trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Lark, 91 A.3d 165 (Pa. Super. 2014) (suggestiveness alone does not require exclusion; require substantial likelihood of misidentification)
- Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228 (Pa. Super. 2013) (identification admissibility judged under totality of circumstances)
- Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325 (Pa. Super. 2012) (suppression aimed to prevent improper police conduct; absent such conduct, suppression not warranted)
- Commonwealth v. Kubis, 978 A.2d 391 (Pa. 2009) (lineup identification not suggestive despite post-selection detective comment)
- Commonwealth v. Pearson, 685 A.2d 551 (Pa. Super. 1996) (failure to object at trial waives issue on appeal)
- Commonwealth v. Rose, 960 A.2d 149 (Pa. Super. 2008) (objection plus request for mistrial preserves appellate review even if made at close of prosecutor’s argument)
- Commonwealth v. Lettau, 955 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. 2008) (standard for mistrial: whether prejudicial event deprived defendant of fair trial and whether trial court abused discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501 (Pa. 2005) (prosecutor afforded reasonable latitude; misconduct requires unavoidable prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 595 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1991) (not every improper remark warrants new trial)
- Commonwealth v. Carson, 913 A.2d 220 (Pa. 2006) (prosecutor may use oratorical flair and reasonable inferences supported by evidence)
