Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395

Background

Defendant Robin Anthony Hoose stabbed and killed Irene Pierce and Frank Blanchard in his apartment on July 17, 2007; he later self‑injured and was hospitalized.
The defendant told Detective Laster at the hospital, “There are two dead bodies in my house,” and later admitted stabbing them; police conducted multiple recorded interviews at the station, obtained Miranda waivers, and ultimately arrested him.
Pretrial motions included suppression of statements (Miranda, voluntariness), change of venue for pretrial publicity, admission of a knife and third‑party culprit evidence/instruction, and admission of expert testimony about false confessions.
The trial judge denied suppression, denied a change of venue, excluded the knife as insufficiently connected to the crime scene but allowed related testimony, refused a special third‑party culprit instruction, and excluded the proffered false‑confession expert under the Lanigan gatekeeping standard.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder; he appealed the rulings and sought relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E; the court affirmed and declined § 33E relief.

Issues

Issue	Commonwealth's Argument	Hoose's Argument	Held
1) Motion to suppress statements (Miranda/right to counsel; voluntariness)	Statements were voluntary, valid Miranda waivers; police did not undermine right to counsel.	Statements were involuntary due to trauma/medication and police undermined right to counsel after attorney met defendant.	Denial affirmed: waivers voluntary; meeting with counsel did not constitute an unambiguous invocation; police conduct did not overbear will.
2) Change of venue for pretrial publicity	Local media coverage was factual and not pervasive/sensational; voir dire could empanel impartial jury.	Publicity was pervasive/sensational and tainted the venire, requiring transfer.	Denial affirmed: defendant failed to show presumptive or actual prejudice; judge empaneled impartial jurors and took protective steps.
3) Admission of knife / third‑party culprit evidence and instruction	Knife lacked sufficient nexus to crime; existing evidence and instructions adequately allowed defense to raise reasonable doubt.	Knife and related proof supported third‑party culprit defense and required a special jury instruction shifting burden.	Exclusion of knife and refusal to give special third‑party instruction affirmed: knife too remote; general burden instructions were constitutionally sufficient.
4) Exclusion of expert testimony re false confessions	Proffered social‑science opinion lacked sufficient reliability (limited sample of proven false confessions; no prevalence data); probative value outweighed by risk of confusion.	Expert testimony about false confessions was scientifically grounded and would assist jury in assessing statement reliability.	Exclusion affirmed: judge properly applied Lanigan/Daubert principles; testimony unreliable or insufficiently probative in these facts, though such testimony may be admissible in other circumstances.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (defendants must be advised of right to remain silent and right to counsel)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (after invoking counsel, interrogation must cease)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (invocation of right to counsel must be clear to a reasonable officer)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. 1993) (federal gatekeeping factors for scientific expert reliability)
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 419 Mass. 15 (Mass. 1994) (Massachusetts standard for admissibility of expert scientific testimony)
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (U.S. 2010) (presumptive prejudice from publicity requires extraordinary, sensational coverage)