Commonwealth v. Holmes
155 A.3d 69
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- Norma Jean Holmes pled guilty to crimes arising from a fatal motor-vehicle incident and was sentenced to two years’ probation with a restitution order of $12,794.50 to the decedent’s parents (Joseph and Laura Nave).
- Holmes moved for reconsideration; the trial court denied relief on January 21, 2014; Holmes appealed seeking vacatur of the restitution order.
- The Superior Court panel determined restitution cannot be imposed both as a condition of probation and as part of a sentence under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a); the probation condition also lacked an ability-to-pay finding under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(c)(8).
- The central legal question on en banc review was whether parents of a deceased victim qualify as mandatory restitution recipients under Section 1106’s definition of “victim,” considering cross-references to a repealed Administrative Code provision and the broader Crime Victims Act (CVA).
- The court reaffirmed precedent holding Section 1106’s mandatory restitution is limited to the direct victim (or agencies/substitutes defined by statute), and family members are not automatic recipients for Section 1106 restitution.
- Because Holmes’ probation term expired long ago, remand to reimpose restitution as a probation condition would be futile; the court would vacate the Section 1106 restitution award to the parents as an illegal sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether parents of deceased victim are "victims" entitled to mandatory restitution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106 | Commonwealth: CVA’s broader definition (via historical cross-reference) allows family members to be restitution recipients | Holmes: Section 1106’s plain definition limits "victim" to the person directly injured by the crime; parents are not direct victims | Held: Section 1106 mandatory restitution is limited to direct victims; parents are not entitled to mandatory restitution under § 1106 |
| Whether restitution was properly imposed as part of the sentence and/or as a probation condition | Commonwealth: restitution may be ordered | Holmes: restitution was improperly imposed both as sentence under § 1106 and as probation condition under § 9754(c)(8) without ability-to-pay finding | Held: Trial court erred to the extent restitution was imposed under § 9754(c)(8) without ability-to-pay finding and restitution cannot be both a sentence under § 1106 and a probation condition |
| Whether the cross-reference to the repealed Administrative Code imports CVA’s broader "victim" definition into § 1106 | Commonwealth: historical reference supports using CVA definitions | Holmes: repeal and subsequent legislative history indicate Section 1106’s scope must be judged under Crimes and Sentencing Codes’ definitions | Held: Courts should treat Section 1106 and the CVA as distinct statutes with different purposes; the broader CVA definition does not expand § 1106 mandatory restitution recipients |
| Whether remand is required to reimpose restitution as probation condition | Commonwealth: may seek restitution via probation | Holmes: probation term expired, so court lacks authority to impose probation conditions now | Held: No remand—probation expired, so remanding would be pointless; vacatur of § 1106 restitution appropriate |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Opperman, 780 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. 2001) (rejected treating parents as victims under § 1106 despite Crime Victims Act)
- Commonwealth v. Langston, 904 A.2d 917 (Pa. Super. 2006) (held CVA claimants are not necessarily direct victims for § 1106 restitution)
- Commonwealth v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204 (Pa. 2013) (recognized distinction between CVA remedies and court-ordered restitution under § 1106)
- Commonwealth v. Harner, 617 A.2d 702 (Pa. 1992) (restitution is statutory; probationary restitution permits a relaxed nexus requirement)
- Commonwealth v. Keenan, 853 A.2d 381 (Pa. Super. 2004) (restitution decision lies within sentencing court discretion)