113 N.E.3d 828
Mass.2019Background
- On June 7, 2009, Jose Hernandez shot and killed Roberto Plaza as Plaza sat in his car after an argument outside Hernandez's home; Hernandez fled, hid the gun, and left the area; he was arrested in Connecticut in November 2009.
- At trial Hernandez admitted shooting but claimed self-defense, asserting Plaza reached for something the shooter reasonably believed was a gun.
- A confidential informant told police shortly after the killing that someone else said he had "put a hit out" on the victim; that information was not presented to the grand jury.
- Miguel Sierra, who retrieved and later sold the firearm, cooperated with the prosecution in exchange for favorable treatment; defense explored Sierra’s plea/deal at trial.
- Trial chemist Erik Koester supervised the scene and testified about gunshot residue; after trial it emerged he had failed several crime‑scene proficiency tests that were not disclosed before trial.
- Hernandez sought dismissal of the indictment, contended his confrontation rights were violated, argued the court improperly limited lay opinion testimony, moved for a new trial based on Koester’s performance deficiencies, and asked for relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Hernandez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grand jury nondisclosure of informant tip | Omission did not undermine grand jury because other evidence (Santiago’s testimony) established probable cause | Informant’s statement implicating another shooter was exculpatory and should have been presented to the grand jury | No error; uncorroborated tip would not have affected grand jury given strong eyewitness evidence implicating Hernandez |
| Limits on cross‑examination of cooperating witness (Sierra) | Commonwealth argued witness bias was explored fully; objections to repetitive or beyond‑scope questions were proper | Court curtailed recross to prevent showing true motive (deal) and thus violated confrontation/cross‑examination rights | No abuse of discretion; defense had ample opportunity to probe cooperation deal and judge reasonably limited repetition |
| Exclusion of lay opinion on heroin withdrawal effects | Such testimony would be specialized and not proper lay opinion; limits preserve rule against lay expert testimony | Admission of Santiago’s observations about victim’s heroin withdrawal was needed to support self‑defense theory | No error; judge allowed Santiago’s personal observations but properly excluded generalized expert‑style opinions from a lay witness |
| Motion for new trial based on nondisclosed Koester deficiencies | Post‑trial discovery of failed proficiency tests and undisclosed pretrial deficiencies justified new trial due to Brady violation and possible prejudice | Koester’s flaws relate only to impeachment; he did not search the vehicle or perform key tasks that would affect the self‑defense claim; no substantial risk of different verdict | Motion denied; some deficiencies should have been disclosed but lack of material prejudice meant no abuse of discretion; newly discovered or posttrial events did not warrant a new trial |
| 33E review to reduce conviction | N/A | Hernandez asked court to reduce murder verdict to manslaughter | Court found no basis to exercise extraordinary relief and affirmed conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. McGahee, 393 Mass. 743 (1985) (prosecutors need not disclose all exculpatory evidence to grand jury)
- Commonwealth v. O'Dell, 392 Mass. 445 (1984) (limits on grand jury disclosure of exculpatory material)
- Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 437 Mass. 33 (2002) (Brady disclosure required when exculpatory evidence would greatly undermine key witness or taint presentation)
- Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209 (1991) (grand jury omission of marginal evidence not reversible where substantial evidence supported indictment)
- Commonwealth v. Watson, 377 Mass. 814 (1979) (trial judge has wide discretion to limit repetitive cross‑examination)
- Commonwealth v. O'Brian, 419 Mass. 470 (1995) (scope limits on redirect/recross examination)
- Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535 (2013) (limits on lay opinion regarding effects of intoxicants)
- Commonwealth v. Sliech‑Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300 (2010) (error to allow lay witnesses to offer expert psychiatric opinions)
- Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369 (2017) (prosecution’s duty to disclose crime‑lab chemist proficiency problems as impeachment under Brady)
- Commonwealth v. Martin, 427 Mass. 816 (1998) (Commonwealth must disclose exculpatory information in possession of prosecution team, including lab chemists)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose materially exculpatory evidence)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (constitutional disclosure obligation exists even without specific defense request)
- Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303 (1986) (standard for granting a new trial; review for abuse of discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401 (1992) (prejudice standard for nondisclosure: substantial risk of different verdict)
- Commonwealth v. Lo, 428 Mass. 45 (1998) (newly discovered evidence that only impeaches typically does not warrant new trial)
- Commonwealth v. Bowden, 379 Mass. 472 (1979) (inadequacy of police investigation may support defense theory)