Commonwealth v. Hearns, 10 N.E.3d 108

In May 2010 two youths were shot in Jamaica Plain; one (Jaewon Martin) died. Police linked a green Acura and occupants (including defendant Timothy Hearns) to the scene.
Boston detectives believed Hearns was a member of the H‑Block gang, engaged in a turf feud with the Heath Street gang; investigators alleged H‑Block was a disciplined group involved in drugs and guns.
A cooperating witness (D.B.) who obtained Hearns’ admission agreed to wear a concealed audio recorder; police obtained a Blood warrant before the recording even though the admission occurred in a car.
Hearns was later arrested, given Miranda warnings, and began a custodial interview; shortly after waiving rights he said, “Well then, I don’t want to talk. I haven’t got nothing to say.” Officers continued questioning and obtained additional statements.
Hearns moved to suppress (1) the surreptitious recorded conversation, arguing the shooting was not a “designated offense” occurring “in connection with organized crime” under G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7, and (2) post‑arrest statements as involuntary/after an effective invocation of the right to remain silent.
The Superior Court denied suppression; on interlocutory appeal the SJC affirmed denial as to the recorded conversation but reversed as to post‑arrest statements after finding Hearns clearly invoked his right to remain silent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of surreptitious recording under one‑party consent exception	Commonwealth: affidavit and corroborating info gave reasonable suspicion that the shooting was a designated offense connected with organized crime, so one‑party consent applied	Hearns: evidence insufficient to show shooting was connected to organized‑crime enterprise; Blood warrant (or equivalent) required for recording	Held: Affirmed — reasonable suspicion supported one‑party consent; H‑Block qualified as organized crime and the shooting plausibly related to gang mission/feud
Whether defendant invoked right to remain silent during custodial interview	Commonwealth: defendant’s “I don’t want to talk” was ambiguous or a negotiation; police permissibly continued questioning	Hearns: statement was a clear, unequivocal invocation requiring cessation of questioning	Held: Reversed suppression denial — statement was a clear invocation; officers should have ceased or clarified, not continue interrogation

Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass. 61 (1987) (warrant required for surreptitious recording in a private home under art. 14)
Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289 (2011) (limits on applying one‑party consent when offense appears to be rogue act, not in connection with organized crime)
Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271 (1981) (one‑party consent exception and reasonable‑suspicion standard for interception)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda rights and right to remain silent)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (clarity required to invoke right to counsel; related standards for invocation)
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (interrogation may continue only until suspect invokes rights)
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (waiver and invocation principles under Miranda)
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 433 Mass. 549 (2001) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319 (1979) (post‑warning refusal to speak can constitute invocation)
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273 (2012) (officer must cease or clarify when invocation is reasonably ambiguous)