Commonwealth v. Harth, K., Aplt.
252 A.3d 600
Pa.2021Background
- Commonwealth filed criminal complaint against Khalid Harth on Jan. 22, 2015; indictment followed Feb. 24, 2015 for robbery/burglary and related counts.
- Trial court set deadlines for disclosure; Commonwealth repeatedly missed discovery dates and sought continuances; several trial dates were rescheduled (including because of the Pope’s visit and co-defendant scheduling conflicts).
- Harth filed Rule 600 (speedy-trial) motions after trial was continued and again on the morning of trial when 15 previously undisclosed exhibits were produced; the trial court denied both motions, relying in part on its own unavailability (“judicial delay”) and placing the burden on Harth to prove lack of diligence.
- Trial proceeded Nov. 28–Dec. 2, 2016; Harth was convicted and sentenced to 8–16 years plus probation and restitution.
- Superior Court vacated sentence and remanded for a due-diligence hearing, directing the trial court to place the burden on the Commonwealth; Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
- Pennsylvania Supreme Court (majority) held that a trial court may treat judicial delay as excludable only after the Commonwealth proves it exercised due diligence throughout the case; because the record showed discovery failures and no proof of due diligence, the Court reversed and discharged Harth.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Harth) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may treat time as "judicial delay" without first requiring the Commonwealth to prove due diligence | Trial court erred; Commonwealth must prove due diligence before judicial delay can be credited | Trial court may exclude judicial delay from Rule 600 calculation without first resolving due diligence; remand needed to clarify record | Commonwealth must prove due diligence first; judicial delay is relevant only after due diligence is shown (held for Harth) |
| Whether remand (for additional evidentiary hearing) or direct discharge is appropriate when trial court failed to assess Commonwealth due diligence | Remand improper because Commonwealth had two chances to prove diligence and failed; thus discharge is proper | Remand appropriate because record is unclear about which discovery was outstanding and whether items were IGJ or non-mandatory; Commonwealth needs chance to present evidence | Court declined remand as unnecessary; it reviewed due diligence de novo and discharged Harth |
| Whether the Mills concurrence (requiring due diligence proof before considering judicial delay) should be adopted as controlling procedure | Court should adopt Mills concurrence framework to require due-diligence proof before judicial-delay exclusion | Mills concurrence not controlling; lower courts should follow existing Rule 600 text and may remand for clarification | Court formally adopts Mills concurrence approach: due diligence must be proven by Commonwealth before judicial delay is considered |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (establishes Barker balancing test for speedy-trial rights)
- Commonwealth v. Mills, 162 A.3d 323 (Pa. 2017) (interpreting amended Rule 600; concurring opinion articulated prerequisite that Commonwealth prove due diligence before judicial delay is considered)
- Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2010) (remand vs. de novo review discussion; Court considered de novo review in interest of judicial economy)
- Commonwealth v. Akridge, 422 A.2d 487 (Pa. 1980) (per curiam) (addresses limits on giving Commonwealth repeated opportunities to prove due diligence)
- Commonwealth v. Ehredt, 401 A.2d 358 (Pa. 1979) (precludes proving due diligence by bare assertions; Commonwealth must present evidence of efforts to secure witnesses/evidence)