Commonwealth v. Harris, 103 N.E.3d 769

Defendant arrested after fleeing police; officers seized a firearm, a white powder later tested as cocaine, and marijuana from his person.
Suspected cocaine underwent a confirmatory test by Annie Dookhan at the Hinton lab; she later pleaded guilty to evidence tampering and obstruction for lab misconduct.
Defendant entered a global plea agreement covering this District Court case and two Superior Court cases, receiving concurrent sentences in the District Court and an aggregate committed sentence in a related Superior Court case.
Five years after pleading guilty, and after learning of Dookhan’s misconduct, defendant moved (amended) to withdraw his guilty pleas in the District Court; the judge denied the motion.
The judge found that Dookhan’s involvement established egregious government misconduct (conceded), but the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of the misconduct.
On appeal, defendant argued the judge abused discretion (1) by finding no reasonable probability he would have gone to trial and (2) by applying the wrong burden; the court affirmed the denial.

Issue	Defendant's Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Was Dookhan’s misconduct sufficient to vacate pleas?	Misconduct undermines the cocaine evidence and so would have led him not to plead.	Dookhan’s involvement establishes egregious misconduct, but defendant must still show reasonable probability he would not have pled.	Misconduct established, but defendant failed to show reasonable probability he would not have pleaded.
Did the judge properly apply the Scott standard (burden of proof)?	Judge adopted Commonwealth memo and thus misapplied the burden.	Judge applied the settled Scott standard requiring demonstration of reasonable probability.	Judge applied correct standard; no misapplication.
Would Dookhan’s misconduct have materially influenced plea decision (effect on evidence)?	Her role as confirmatory chemist would have undercut the cocaine charge’s factual basis.	Other independent evidence (primary chemist, positive field test, seizures from person, strong non‑cocaine evidence) undermines that claim.	Even if Dookhan’s role weakened the cocaine charge, other evidence and plea benefits made it unlikely defendant would refuse the global deal.
Does allowance of new trial in related 2008 Superior Court case compel relief here?	Prior allowance suggests similar relief should follow.	The 2008 case differed: Dookhan was the primary chemist there; motions decided separately.	The earlier allowance does not make this result inconsistent; circumstances differed.

Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336 (2014) (establishes conclusive presumption of egregious lab misconduct and requires showing reasonable probability plea was affected)
Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101 (2009) (motions to withdraw plea treated as motions for new trial)
Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435 (2006) (standard of review for denial of motion to withdraw plea/abuse of discretion inquiry)
Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303 (1986) (abuse of discretion standard quoted for trial rulings)
Commonwealth v. Antone, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 810 (2017) (primary chemist’s test may be admissible even if confirmatory test is tainted)
Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136 (2013) (presumptively positive field test, properly founded, can be persuasive evidence)
Commonwealth v. Warren, 475 Mass. 530 (2016) (search/seizure precedent relied on by defendant but decided after plea)
Commonwealth v. Meneus, 476 Mass. 231 (2017) (search/seizure precedent relied on by defendant but decided after plea)