Commonwealth v. Hardy, 123 N.E.3d 773

In June 2014 Suzanne Hardy drove with her two nephews (Dylan, age 4; Jayce, 16 months) and her children; Hardy and her son survived, both nephews died from blunt force trauma in a multivehicle collision.
At the time of the crash Dylan was belted in the rear middle seat without a booster (though his size required one by law); Jayce was in a front-facing safety seat that should have been rear-facing for his age/size.
The defendant approached a stopped dump truck, did not brake, swerved, struck a guardrail, crossed into oncoming traffic and was involved in high‑impact collisions; accident reconstruction experts attributed the crash to the defendant’s inattention.
Experts testified booster seats improve survivability and that all three child seats could have been properly installed in the rear seat; the medical examiner could not say whether correct restraint would have prevented death.
Hardy was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Dylan), negligent motor vehicle homicide (Dylan and Jayce), and reckless endangerment of a child (Dylan); she appealed, challenging sufficiency as to manslaughter and §13L reckless endangerment and arguing prosecutorial misconduct in closing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence supported involuntary manslaughter (wanton or reckless conduct) for Dylan	Hardy’s decision to remove/leave a booster seat out of the occupied rear seat and her dangerous driving together created a high degree of likelihood of substantial harm sufficient for wanton/reckless conduct	Evidence at most showed negligence or inattentiveness and statutory violation; not the conscious choice to run a grave risk required for wanton/recklessness	Reversed: insufficient evidence to prove wanton or reckless conduct for manslaughter; judgments of guilty vacated and not guilty findings ordered
Whether evidence supported reckless endangerment of a child (G. L. c. 265, §13L) as to Dylan	Combined driving conduct and failure to use booster established a substantial risk and, under §13L, the defendant was aware of that risk	§13L requires actual awareness of risk; here there was no proof Hardy appreciated that failing to use a booster created a high probability of substantial harm	Reversed: insufficient evidence Hardy actually was aware of the high degree of likely harm; conviction set aside

Commonwealth v. Carter, 481 Mass. 352 (defines manslaughter as unlawful homicide caused by wanton or reckless conduct)
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (wanton or reckless conduct requires conscious choice to run grave danger)
Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341 (definition of wanton or reckless; focus on awareness or reasonable‑person standard)
Commonwealth v. Pugh, 462 Mass. 482 (wanton or reckless may be an omission where duty to act exists)
Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 452 Mass. 97 (high‑danger driving facts that supported wanton/reckless findings)
Commonwealth v. Dragotta, 476 Mass. 680 (distinguishing negligence from wanton/reckless in child‑care contexts)
Commonwealth v. Power, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 398 (statutory/regulatory violations alone do not necessarily establish wanton/reckless conduct)
Commonwealth v. Chapman, 433 Mass. 481 (example where conduct posed an apparent high likelihood of substantial harm)