187 A.3d 927
Pa. Super. Ct.2018Background
- Gould, on parole, was observed by State Trooper Velez at a Lancaster hotel; Velez told Parole Agent Robert Clites Gould had been there and gave a car description.
- Clites reviewed Gould’s parole file (no approval to stay overnight in Lancaster; parole terms allowed warrantless searches) and, after supervisor direction, went to the hotel the next evening.
- Clites parked behind Gould’s car, identified himself, had Gould exit, smelled burnt marijuana, frisked him (found cash), and opened the vehicle console finding drug packaging; State Police narcotics dog later alerted to the car exterior.
- Trooper Velez prepared a warrant affidavit that omitted Clites’s on-scene search and detention; the affidavit relied on confidential informants, surveillance, and the dog sniff, and a warrant issued.
- Trial court denied Gould’s motion to suppress; Gould was convicted of possession with intent to deliver and sentenced; he appealed arguing (1) Clites lacked reasonable suspicion and acted as a police agent (stalking horse), and (2) the warrant omitted material facts and thus lacked probable cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gould) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was Clites’s detention and search lawful under parole-search standards? | Clites only had Velez’s observation from prior night and lacked reasonable suspicion to detain/search. | Clites had corroboration (vehicle, time, parole file showing no approval to stay overnight, prior sanctions) and smelled marijuana; parole-search standard applies. | Held: Clites had reasonable suspicion to detain and search under parole standards. |
| 2. Was Clites acting as a "stalking horse" for police (requiring probable cause/warrant)? | Clites functioned at the behest of State Police to gather evidence for criminal prosecution, so his search was police action. | Record shows Clites acted to investigate parole compliance, not as police; no express/tacit agreement to act as police. | Held: No stalking-horse; Clites acted as a parole officer. |
| 3. Did omission of Clites’s search from the warrant affidavit render the warrant invalid? | The affidavit omitted material facts (Clites’s warrantless search and findings); dog sniff and warrant were tainted by that illegality. | Magistrate need only assess probable cause from the affidavit; even excluding any tainted evidence, independent informant corroboration and surveillance supported probable cause. | Held: Omission did not make affidavit misleading; independent evidence supported probable cause; warrant valid. |
| 4. Should evidence be suppressed as fruit of unlawful search? | If Clites’s search was unlawful, the subsequent police actions and warrant were fruits and should be suppressed. | Even if Clites’s search were suppressed, independent-source and probable-cause evidence (CI detail, room search, surveillance, dog sniff) support the warrant and admission. | Held: No suppression; independent probable cause/independent-source doctrine salvages the warrant and evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1997) (parolee searches require less than probable cause; reasonable suspicion standard for parole searches)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 85 A.3d 530 (Pa. Super. 2014) (smell of marijuana can supply reasonable suspicion for parole search)
- Commonwealth v. Altadonna, 817 A.2d 1145 (Pa. Super. 2003) (parole officers assisting investigations not acting as police where purpose was parole compliance)
- Commonwealth v. Parker, 152 A.3d 309 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stalking-horse doctrine and test focusing on purpose of officer’s actions)
- Commonwealth v. Brown, 361 A.2d 846 (Pa. Super. 1976) (parole/probation officer ‘switched hats’ when acting as police to gather evidence for prosecution)
- Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275 (Pa. 2007) (dog-sniff and independent-source analyses; unlawfully obtained evidence may be excised when independent probable cause remains)