Commonwealth v. Gomes
475 Mass. 775
| Mass. | 2016Background
- On Feb. 13, 2007, occupants of a Chevrolet Impala (driven by Gomes, passenger Emmanuel DaSilva) opened fire on a group near David Evans's house; Fausto Sanchez was killed and several others wounded. Shell casings consistent with casings found in the Impala were recovered at/near the scene.
- Gomes was arrested after the Impala was stopped minutes after the shooting; police later searched the Langdon Street building (owned by Gomes's parents) and seized drugs, cash, and multiple firearms.
- Commonwealth's theory: Gomes and Emmanuel acted as joint venturers to retaliate against Evans for an earlier incident that caused police to secure the family building; motive and joint venture supported first‑degree murder and related charges.
- Defense theory: mistaken identity and lack of knowledge/intent to kill; challenge to evidence seized at Langdon Street and to certain testimonial rulings and juror questions.
- Jury convicted Gomes of first‑degree murder (deliberate premeditation) and related weapons/assault counts; sentence: life without parole plus additional term. Court of Appeals affirms convictions and denies § 33E relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to prove Gomes knowingly participated with specific intent to kill | Evidence (driving, stopping parallel to victims, shots fired from Impala, matching shell casings) permits inference of joint venture and specific intent | No rational jury could find beyond reasonable doubt that Gomes knowingly participated or shared intent to kill | Affirmed: evidence sufficient to support convictions and inference of joint venture/intent |
| Admission of items seized at Langdon St. (drugs, cash, guns, papers) | Relevant to motive, intent, and knowledge of family loss that could motivate retaliation | Irrelevant or unduly prejudicial; little direct link between Gomes and contraband | Admitted for limited purpose (motive/intent/knowledge); probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice given limiting instructions |
| Permitting juror questions and specific juror-question responses (seat spacing, mirror damage, ejection distances) | Responses aided Commonwealth and were speculative or foundationally weak; jurors made advocates, risk of premature deliberation | Questions were vetted by judge; answers were qualified, based on witness experience, and not prejudicial | No reversible error: judge followed Urena/Britto procedures; no showing of actual prejudice |
| Denial of request for transferred intent instruction (and related instruction on proving intent to kill Evans specifically) | Requested instruction to avoid dilution of burden when motive focused on Evans; proposed transferred intent if jury found intent to kill different person | Transferred intent not applicable; Commonwealth need not prove intent to kill Evans specifically when shots were fired at group | Denial proper: transferred intent instruction unnecessary because prosecution proved intent to kill one or more in the group, not solely Evans |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 409 (applies standard for viewing evidence in light most favorable to Commonwealth)
- Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770 (standard for required finding motions)
- Commonwealth v. Campbell, 378 Mass. 680 (burden for required finding review)
- Commonwealth v. Cintron, 435 Mass. 509 (permitting inferences from circumstantial evidence and lay witness foundation)
- Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 692 (procedures for juror questioning)
- Commonwealth v. Britto, 433 Mass. 596 (juror questioning discretion and limits)
- Commonwealth v. DaSilva, 471 Mass. 71 (evidence of uncharged conduct relevant to motive/retaliation)
- Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228 (Mass. Evid. §403 balancing test and unfair prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Shea, 460 Mass. 163 (transferred intent instruction context)
- Commonwealth v. Puleio, 394 Mass. 101 (transferred intent instruction context)