Commonwealth v. Glover
459 Mass. 836
| Mass. | 2011Background
- January 30, 1992, a jury convicted Corey Glover of second-degree murder for Forrest Hall's stabbing death.
- Appeals Court affirmed multiple times; post-trial motions for a new trial were denied; extensive appellate history.
- Defense used strategy to seek only self-defense and excessive use of force in self-defense manslaughter instructions; declined reasonable provocation instruction.
- Trial evidence: victim deterred by defendant during a prior robbery; stabbing occurred with a knife; defendant claimed self-defense.
- Jury instruction dynamics: judge instructed manslaughter only on excessive use of force in self-defense; defense did not favor reasonable provocation instruction; jury asked questions about self-defense, malice, and manslaughter.
- Issue on appeal: whether trial counsel's failure to request reasonable provocation instruction violated effective assistance; court held strategy was not manifestly unreasonable and not prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to request reasonable provocation instruction was ineffective assistance. | Glover argues evidence warranted provocation instruction; counsel's omission deprived defense ground. | Glover's counsel reasonably chose to pursue self-defense theory; avoiding provocation instruction preserved defense impact. | Not manifestly unreasonable; no substantial risk of miscarriage; affirmed denial of motion for new trial. |
| Whether defense strategy to rely solely on self-defense foreclosed viable provocation theories. | Reasonable provocation could have yielded voluntary manslaughter verdict. | Dual theories could undermine self-defense case; focusing on one theory was strategic. | Strategic decision not manifestly unreasonable; no miscarriage risk. |
| Whether any instructional error created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice. | Omitting provocation instruction could have changed outcome. | Evidence supported excessive self-defense; no substantial risk from not instructing provocation. | No substantial risk; court affirmed denial; any misstatement about acquittal was isolated and harmless. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435 (Mass. 2006) (guides when to instruct on reasonable provocation and excessive self-defense)
- Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263 (Mass. 1990) (definition of voluntary manslaughter)
- Commonwealth v. Walden, 380 Mass. 724 (Mass. 1980) (provocation standard for reasonable provocation)
- Commonwealth v. Andrade, 422 Mass. 236 (Mass. 1996) (timing of cooling-off period in heat of passion)
- Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201 (Mass. 2001) (objective and subjective reasonableness in provocation)
- Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213 (Mass. 2005) (relation between provocation and excessive force theories)
- Commonwealth v. Hinds, 457 Mass. 83 (Mass. 2010) (evidence required for excessive self-defense instruction)
- Commonwealth v. Lapage, 435 Mass. 480 (Mass. 2001) (tie between provocation and self-defense evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Colon, 449 Mass. 207 (Mass. 2007) (self-defense calculation may affect provocation theory applicability)
- Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722 (Mass. 1978) (manifestly unreasonable strategy standard for ineffective assistance)
- Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175 (Mass. 2005) (standard for evaluating defense counsel strategy)
- Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. 345 (Mass. 1982) (defense strategy and lesser-included offense guidance)
- Commonwealth v. Fenton F., 442 Mass. 31 (Mass. 2004) (hindsight and evaluation of counsel's performance)
- Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (Mass. 1974) (standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance)
- Commonwealth v. Glacken, 451 Mass. 163 (Mass. 2008) (acquittal instruction when self-defense fails)
- Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731 (Mass. 1990) (all-or-nothing approach to defense strategy)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel)
