Commonwealth v. Gill
158 A.3d 719
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2013 Gill was charged with burglary and related offenses after the victim reported ~$40,000 stolen from a lockbox in his basement; police alleged entry via garage keypad and the lockbox was opened with a key hanging nearby.
- In 2016 the same victim reported two burglaries (June 23 and June 27) involving approximately $40,000 taken from the same residence; those incidents involved climbing a woodpile to a second-floor sliding door, pry marks on the lockbox in one incident, and forced basement entry in the other.
- Gill moved in limine to admit evidence of the 2016 incidents (and earlier 1995 accusations by the victim against others) to show someone else committed the 2013 burglary; the trial court permitted admission of the 2016 incidents and ordered the Commonwealth to produce all related reports.
- The Commonwealth appealed the pretrial order, arguing the 2016 incidents were not sufficiently similar to the 2013 burglary to be admissible as proof that another person committed the 2013 crime and that disclosure order improperly handicapped the prosecution.
- The Superior Court reviewed admissibility under the “highly detailed similarity” and remoteness-in-time standards for other-crimes evidence and reversed the trial court, holding the 2016 incidents were not sufficiently distinctive to show the same perpetrator and that the disclosure order was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of 2016 burglaries as evidence that someone else committed the 2013 burglary | The Commonwealth: 2016 incidents are irrelevant/dissimilar—different entry methods and use of force | Gill: 2016 incidents are highly similar (same house, same ~$40,000, lockbox/key used) and thus probative of another perpetrator | Reversed: 2016 incidents are not so highly similar or distinctive to identify the same perpetrator; remoteness in time and differences in modus operandi render them inadmissible for that purpose |
| Scope of trial court’s order (which 2016 incidents admitted) | Commonwealth: Order is unclear and overbroad; both incidents not sufficiently similar | Gill: Both 2016 incidents are relevant and should be admitted; court ordered production of all materials | Trial court’s scope unclear; regardless, admission of either or both incidents was erroneous due to lack of requisite similarity |
| Disclosure of Commonwealth investigatory files on 2016 incidents | Commonwealth: Order to produce all reports substantially handicaps prosecution and was improper given inadmissibility | Gill: Production necessary to prepare defense and cross-examine witnesses about similar incidents | Reversed: Disclosure order was tied to erroneous admissibility ruling; ordering production was error |
| Admission of 1995 accusations by victim against others | Commonwealth: Remote and irrelevant to 2013 burglary | Gill: Prior accusations show victim’s tendency to falsely accuse others, relevant to identity issue | Trial court excluded 1995 allegations; Superior Court did not disturb that exclusion |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Belani, 101 A.3d 1156 (Pa. Super. 2014) (standard of review for motions in limine and evidentiary rulings)
- Commonwealth v. Patagonia, 868 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2005) (other-crimes evidence admissible to show another committed the charged crime only when crimes are highly distinctive)
- Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 691 A.2d 907 (Pa. 1997) (probative value of similarity inversely proportional to temporal gap between crimes)
- Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353 (Pa. Super. 2015) (similarity and remoteness factors in other-crimes analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 74 A.3d 228 (Pa. Super. 2013) (requirement of high correlation in details to admit other-crimes evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Nocero, 582 A.2d 376 (Pa. Super. 1990) (evidence of other crimes remote by months/years generally inadmissible)