Commonwealth v. Gibson, 19 A.3d 512

This capital post-conviction matter concerns Gibson’s murder of Officer Dukes and bystander Nixon during a 1990 Philadelphia bar robbery.
PCRA remands addressed whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to present life-history and mental-health mitigation at the penalty phase.
On remand, the PCRA court credited witnesses and experts (O’Brien, Bernstein, Michals) and a 1988 Byrne evaluation to show mitigation (e(2), (e)(3), (e(8)).
The court found a reasonable probability that, with the additional mitigation, at least one juror would have voted for life instead of death.
Commonwealth appealed contending substantial aggravation and inconsistent mitigation evidence defeat prejudice.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, denying post-conviction relief, concluding the new mitigation evidence was not reasonably likely to change the outcome given the strong aggravation and other considerations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the PCRA court erred in finding prejudice from trial-counsel ineffectiveness at the penalty phase.	Gibson claims additional mitigation would have tilted one juror toward life.	Commonwealth argues aggravation was powerful; the new mitigation would not likely change the verdict.	No prejudice established; not reasonably likely to alter the outcome.
Whether the (e)(2), (e)(3), and (e)(8) mitigators could have altered the sentencing result.	Mitigators (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(8) supported by life-history and intoxication evidence.	Evidence insufficient to establish these mitigators would sway at least one juror.	Not reasonably likely to alter the outcome even with the mitigators.
Whether the PCRA court erred in crediting testimony and reliance on untested declarations.	Credible mitigation evidence from post-conviction hearings should be given weight.	Some sources (untested declarations) were unreliable; cross-examination would test them.	Court’s credibility determinations did not change the prejudice ruling.

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 547 Pa. 71, 688 A.2d 1152 (1997) (Gibson I), 547 Pa. 71 (Pa. 1997) (direct-appeal decision detailing underlying facts and penalties)
Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110 (2008) (Gibson III), 597 Pa. 402 (Pa. 2008) (post-conviction decision addressing mitigation and prejudice remand)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes standard for ineffective-assistance prejudice)
Commonwealth v. Lesko, Pa. , 15 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2011) (reweighing framework for post-conviction mitigation evidence)
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067 (2006) (Pa. 2006) (guides prejudice assessment in capital sentencing)
Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 856 A.2d 767 (2004) (Pa. 2004) (discusses Strickland prejudice and mitigation)
Commonwealth v. Flor, 606 Pa. 384, 998 A.2d 606 (2010) (Pa. 2010) (voluntary intoxication and (e)(3) instructional issue)
Commonwealth v. Marinelli, 570 Pa. 622, 810 A.2d 1257 (2002) (Pa. 2002) (limits on intoxication-based mitigation)
Commonwealth v. Rice, 568 Pa. 182, 795 A.2d 340 (2002) (Pa. 2002) (limits on (e)(2) related interpretations)