Commonwealth v. Gaines
127 A.3d 15
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Gaines was convicted after jury trial and sentenced to 102–360 months; direct appeal affirmed and judgment became final September 15, 2011.
- Gaines timely filed a PCRA petition (Sept. 14, 2012) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an erroneous prior-record-score used at sentencing.
- On April 12, 2013 the PCRA court, on stipulation, granted resentencing due to an incorrect prior record score and scheduled resentencing; the court also addressed remaining PCRA issues and allowed leave to amend.
- Gaines filed an amended PCRA petition (May 21, 2013) raising ineffective-assistance claims; the PCRA court denied that petition by order docketed July 15, 2013 and mailed July 17, 2013.
- The trial court resentenced Gaines July 17, 2013 (64–156 months) and corrected an RRRI eligibility issue July 30, 2013; Gaines filed a notice of appeal on August 19, 2013 (three days late if appeal period began July 17).
- The Superior Court sua sponte examined appellate jurisdiction, held the July 15, 2013 PCRA order was a final appealable order under Pa.R.Crim.P. 910, found Gaines’s notice of appeal untimely, and quashed the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gaines) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Majority view) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the PCRA court's July 15, 2013 order was final for appeal | Gaines: the appeal should run from the subsequent July 17, 2013 resentencing (so the appeal was timely) | Majority/Commonwealth: Rule 910 deems an order disposing of a PCRA petition final when entered; appeal period began when order was mailed July 17 | The court held the July 15 order was final under Rule 910 and appeal was untimely |
| Whether a PCRA order granting resentencing but denying guilt-phase relief should be appealable only after resentencing | Gaines: final order is the resentencing (to avoid premature appeals and waiver traps) | Majority: adopting Gaines’s rule would conflict with Rule 910, create sweeping procedural consequences, and invade Supreme Court rulemaking power | The court rejected Gaines’s proposed rule and adhered to Rule 910 |
| Whether the notice-of-appeal deadline started on docket date or mailing date | Gaines: argued later mailing triggered deadline (counsel receipt) | Majority: Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1) controls; period begins on mailing by clerk | The court held the appeal period began on mailing (July 17, 2013) |
| Whether the May 21, 2013 filing was an amendment or an untimely second PCRA petition (concurrence) | Majority: treated May 21 filing as an amended PCRA petition | Concurring judges: view May 21 filing as an untimely second petition barred by PCRA time limits | Court plurality avoided resolving that characterization as outcome rested on untimeliness of appeal; concurrence would quash for being a second untimely petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Bryant, 780 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2001) (PCRA order denying guilt-phase relief but granting resentencing is final; Supreme Court disapproved Superior Court procedure requiring wait for resentencing)
- Commonwealth v. Andre, 17 A.3d 951 (Pa. Super. 2011) (appellate court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte)
- Commonwealth v. Pena, 31 A.3d 704 (Pa. Super. 2011) (Rule 903 filing period is jurisdictional and strictly construed)
- Commonwealth v. Fahy, 959 A.2d 312 (Pa. 2008) (PCRA time limits are jurisdictional and must be strictly construed)
- In re Fourth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 509 A.2d 1260 (Pa. 1986) (entry date of an order is the day the clerk mails or delivers copies to the parties)
- Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649 (Pa. Super. 2013) (an untimely PCRA petition deprives the court of jurisdiction to reach merits)