Commonwealth v. Ford
122 A.3d 414
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- Appellee Louis Purnell Ford was charged in Jan 2014 with heroin delivery offenses based on transactions involving a confidential informant.
- Ford moved to recuse the Clinton County District Attorney’s Office, alleging a conflict because Assistant District Attorney Paul Ryan formerly represented him in two prior matters (including a prior drug-related matter) while at the Public Defender’s Office.
- At the recusal hearing defense counsel argued Ryan obtained confidential information (prior record details, truth-telling patterns, facts of prior cases) that could be used against Ford.
- The trial court granted recusal of the entire Clinton County DA’s Office, concluding there was a substantial risk Ryan possessed confidential information that could materially advance the prosecution.
- The Commonwealth appealed the disqualification of the DA’s Office; the Superior Court reviewed whether disqualification of the prosecutor and/or the entire office was required under Pa.R.P.C. 1.9 and precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Ford) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ADA Ryan must be disqualified for prior representation | Ryan’s prior representations were years earlier and unrelated; Ford offered only assertions, not proof of confidential disclosures | Ryan obtained confidential, case-related information as former counsel that creates a conflict under Rule 1.9 | ADA Ryan is disqualified from the prosecution (trial court did not abuse discretion) |
| Whether the entire Clinton County DA’s Office must be disqualified vicariously | Vicarious disqualification is unnecessary absent evidence Ryan shared confidential info with others or that a firewall couldn’t be used | Entire office must be removed to avoid risk of mistrial from possible disclosure | Remanded: record insufficient to support disqualification of entire DA’s Office; court must hold hearing on disclosure/firewall and then decide |
| Standard for applying Pa.R.P.C. 1.9 to prosecutor who formerly represented defendant | Rule should be applied narrowly; require substantial proof confidential info exists and was shared | Rule prohibits representation in the same or substantially related matter if confidential info could materially advance the new client’s position | Rule 1.9 bars former counsel from representing materially adverse client in substantially related matters; defendant need not disclose privileged information to show risk |
| Burden to show actual prejudice vs. conflict requiring removal | Must show actual prejudice from former representation | An actual conflict exists and removal is required without proof of prejudice if confidential info poses substantial risk | Where an actual conflict exists, prosecution is barred without need to prove actual prejudice; here conflict as to Ryan established |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Simms, 799 A.2d 853 (Pa. Super. 2002) (review of disqualification/conflict of interest is for abuse of discretion)
- Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. 2014) (actual prosecutor conflict bars prosecution without proof of prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d 700 (Pa. 1992) (same principle: conflict removal without showing actual prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Miller, 422 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super. 1980) (individual disqualification is the general rule; entire DA office not automatically disqualified)
- Commonwealth v. Smith, 835 A.2d 399 (Pa. Super. 2003) (vicarious disqualification requires evidence that former defender participated in or shared information with prosecutors)