Commonwealth v. Figueroa
468 Mass. 204
Mass.2014Background
- Defendant shot and killed Alcantara in a Lawrence restaurant after a long-standing dispute over debts; defendant later admitted the shooting but claimed extreme intoxication prevented premeditation.
- Police, using a taxi driver’s account, located 59-61 Salem St.; after searching the first-floor with consent of an occupant, officers heard running in the upstairs unit, forcibly entered without a warrant, found and arrested defendant hiding under a bed, and seized ammunition from a duffel bag in the bedroom. Police returned the next morning to the first-floor unit and seized a firearm. Defendant moved to suppress both entries and related evidence.
- An eyewitness (Paulino) made a one-on-one showup about 2.5 hours after the shooting and identified the defendant; defendant moved to suppress that identification as suggestive.
- At trial, jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder (deliberate premeditation). Defense argued intoxication negated premeditation/intent.
- On appeal the court (Gants, J.) rejected suppression and most instructional claims but held the trial judge erred by giving a Tuey‑Rodriguez (mistrial/coercive) instruction limited to first‑degree murder after the jury reported being split; that error could have coerced a first‑degree verdict, so court reversed the first‑degree conviction and remanded for second‑degree entry or retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of warrantless entry into upstairs unit (exigent circumstances) | Police had probable cause and exigency (risk of flight, destruction of evidence, safety) justified immediate entry | Entry violated warrant requirement; factual description insufficient for probable cause | Entry justified by exigent circumstances; suppression denied |
| Seizure of ammunition in bedroom (search incident to arrest / inevitable discovery / consent) | Ammunition within arrestee’s immediate control and/or would be inevitably discovered after consented search | Seizure invalid because defendant was handcuffed/removed before discovery | Seizure valid as search incident to arrest; alternatively inevitable discovery after voluntary consent |
| Suppression of showup identification | Showup was prompt and justified by public safety/need to confirm suspect; not unduly suggestive | Procedure was inherently suggestive and risked mistaken ID | Denial of suppression affirmed: showup not unnecessarily suggestive under circumstances |
| Jury instruction after note re: first vs second degree (Tuey‑Rodriquez instruction limited to first‑degree) | Instruction assuring mistrial if unable to agree on first degree was proper | Instruction coerced holdouts to accept first‑degree verdict rather than risk mistrial; violated "soft transition" practice | Instruction was error; Massachusetts follows soft‑transition/reasonable‑efforts rule; reversal of first‑degree conviction and remand for second‑degree entry or retrial |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676 (discussing exigent‑circumstances limits on warrantless entry)
- Commonwealth v. Roth, 437 Mass. 777 (explaining lesser‑included offenses and jury general‑verdict practice)
- Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295 (model Massachusetts reasonable‑doubt instruction)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (scope of search incident to arrest)
- Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (inevitable discovery doctrine)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (standing to challenge searches — expectation of privacy)
- Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (no fixed form required for reasonable‑doubt instruction)
- Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (conviction of lesser included offense treated as implied acquittal of greater offense)