Commonwealth v. Ferreira
90 Mass. App. Ct. 491
| Mass. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- In 1969, 15-year-old John McCabe was found dead of asphyxiation; evidence showed he had been bound and gagged. Three youths (Shelley, Brown, and then-teenage Ferreira) were implicated decades later.
- Brown eventually confessed (in 2011) and entered a cooperation agreement pleading to manslaughter in exchange for truthful testimony; Shelley was later convicted of first-degree murder; Ferreira was acquitted of murder after a jury trial.
- Ferreira had testified before a grand jury in 2008, denying knowledge of what happened to McCabe; a subsequent perjury indictment charged him for those denials.
- After acquittal on the murder indictment, Ferreira moved to dismiss the perjury indictment on collateral estoppel/double jeopardy grounds, arguing the jury necessarily rejected Brown’s testimony and the Commonwealth could not relitigate his credibility.
- The motion judge granted the dismissal, reasoning that the felony-murder acquittal (based on kidnapping as the predicate felony) necessarily rejected Brown’s account; the Commonwealth appealed.
- The Appeals Court reversed: perjury elements differ from murder; and because the murder acquittal was a general verdict, the record did not establish that the jury necessarily rejected Brown’s credibility on the facts required for perjury prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether collateral estoppel (double jeopardy) bars the perjury prosecution entirely | Commonwealth: perjury is a distinct offense; acquittal does not bar new prosecution | Ferreira: acquittal on murder (esp. felony-murder) necessarily rejected Brown’s testimony, so Commonwealth cannot relitigate his credibility in a perjury trial | Held: No bar to prosecution; perjury elements are distinct from murder and acquittal did not preclude perjury charge |
| Whether collateral estoppel forbids use of Brown’s testimony at the perjury trial | Commonwealth: may present Brown; murder acquittal does not necessarily mean jury rejected Brown’s testimony | Ferreira: the jury’s acquittal on felony-murder necessarily shows they found Brown not credible, so his testimony cannot be used again | Held: Court may call Brown; record permits a rational basis for acquittal other than rejecting Brown’s credibility, so estoppel does not preclude his testimony |
| Whether a general acquittal requires inquiry into the prior record to determine what the jury necessarily decided | Commonwealth: where verdict is general, the court must examine the prior record to see if an issue was necessarily decided | Ferreira: contends the record shows necessary rejection of Brown’s account | Held: Court must examine pleadings, evidence, charge; here that review showed jury could have believed Brown yet acquitted on grounds (e.g., lack of conscious disregard) unrelated to Brown’s truthfulness |
| Whether kidnapping (predicate felony) is inherently dangerous or required for felony-murder estoppel analysis | Ferreira: urges kidnapping is inherently dangerous, making felony-murder findings compelled by Brown’s testimony | Commonwealth: no Massachusetts precedent adopting that rule; jury could rationally find no conscious disregard despite Brown’s account | Held: Not necessary to decide; even assuming kidnapping could be inherently dangerous, jury reasonably could conclude Ferreira lacked conscious disregard, so estoppel fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (establishes collateral estoppel in criminal cases where an issue of ultimate fact has been determined)
- Commonwealth v. Benson, 389 Mass. 473 (1983) (explains two ways collateral estoppel can operate in criminal prosecutions)
- Commonwealth v. Leggett, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 730 (2012) (collateral estoppel principles in Massachusetts practice)
- Commonwealth v. Coleman, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 541 (1985) (three-part test for collateral estoppel application)
- Commonwealth v. Ringuette, 60 Mass. App. Ct. 351 (2004) (advocates a realistic, non-hypertechnical application of collateral estoppel)
- Carrasquillo v. Commonwealth, 422 Mass. 1014 (1996) (acquittal of murder did not bar later prosecution for conspiracy to commit same murder)
- Commonwealth v. Lopez, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 390 (2011) (defines "conscious disregard" standard for felony-murder predicate felonies)
- Commonwealth v. Hude, 492 Pa. 600 (1980) (Pennsylvania case where perjury prosecution impermissibly retried issues accepted as true by previous acquittal)