Commonwealth v. Faurelus
147 A.3d 905
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- In October 2008 Faurelus shot and killed Christly Aristide; he admitted firing but claimed self‑defense. Eyewitnesses testified Faurelus later beat the dying victim and attempted to cover up the crime.
- Police recovered gunshot residue on Faurelus and, via a tip, the firearm from an associate. Victim had multiple wounds to vital organs.
- A letter from Faurelus (addressed to his girlfriend) urging witness tampering was delivered to the district attorney’s office in an opened envelope; the prosecutor opened and reviewed it pretrial.
- Faurelus was convicted of third‑degree murder and separately pled/guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm; sentenced to 20–40 years. Direct appeals were denied.
- Faurelus filed a timely PCRA petition raising multiple ineffective‑assistance claims relating to trial and appellate strategy, evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and a prosecutor remark. The PCRA court denied relief and the Superior Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Faurelus's Argument | Commonwealth/Respondent Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency/malice burden —whether jury was told Commonwealth must disprove heat of passion | Faurelus: counsel should have argued jury instruction shifted burden and failed to instruct Commonwealth must disprove heat of passion | Trial court did instruct Commonwealth bore burden and explained heat of passion negates malice; evidence supported malice inference from use of deadly weapon | No ineffective assistance; instruction adequate and no prejudice |
| Appellate counsel —failure to raise insufficiency re: self‑defense in 1925(b) or seek remand to supplement | Faurelus: appellate counsel omitted preserved sufficiency claim challenging Commonwealth’s disproof of self‑defense | Counsel made strategic decision not to pursue weak sufficiency claim; remand unnecessary | No ineffective assistance; reasonable strategy and no prejudice |
| Suppression hearing —ADA Tokash hearsay testimony about who dropped off the letter | Faurelus: counsel should have objected to hearsay and exclusion of letter evidence | Counsel focused on privacy/Government‑search theory; letter corroborated other testimony and was cumulative | No ineffective assistance; no prejudice because evidence was cumulative |
| Jury reinstruction on malice during deliberations | Faurelus: counsel should have sought fuller or different reinstruction when jury requested definition | Trial court re‑explained malice and distinctions between degrees thoroughly | No ineffective assistance; no basis to object because court adequately reinstructed |
| Voluntary manslaughter instruction wording | Faurelus: jury misled to think specific intent to kill required for voluntary manslaughter | Court’s instruction viewed as whole; Commonwealth had strong evidence of intent to kill from weapon use and beating | No ineffective assistance; lack of prejudice given overwhelming evidence of intent |
| Prosecutor closing remark re: lack of cuts on Faurelus’s hand | Faurelus: counsel should have objected because prosecutor lacked expert to say slide would cut hand | Prosecutor’s remark was a reasonable inference responding to defense argument; trial court instructed jurors arguments are not evidence | No ineffective assistance; remark not so prejudicial to warrant relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Harris, 817 A.2d 1033 (Pa. 2002) (private searches are beyond Fourth Amendment/Article I, §8; government intrusion tested by whether it exceeded private search)
- Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731 (Pa. 2015) (malice and specific intent may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body)
- Commonwealth v. Arrington, 86 A.3d 831 (Pa. 2014) (supporting principle that deadly‑weapon use permits inference of intent/malice)
- Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121 (Pa. 2012) (Strickland standard and presumption of effective assistance)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (U.S. 1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294 (Pa. 2014) (to show prejudice from counsel’s failure to object to jury charge, petitioner must show reasonable probability of different outcome)