Commonwealth v. Farabaugh
136 A.3d 995
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- In 1994–95, Victim (under 16) alleged Appellant Raymond Farabaugh (then 25) committed indecent assaults while she worked on his farm; she reported it in 2010.
- Commonwealth charged Farabaugh (Jan. 2011) with aggravated indecent assault (felony) and indecent assault (2d‑degree misdemeanor).
- On April 26, 2011, Farabaugh pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor indecent‑assault count under a negotiated plea: two years’ probation, fines, community service, treatment, no contact with victim; the Commonwealth nolle prossed the felony. The plea and written colloquy expressly represented the misdemeanor was non‑reportable under then‑existing Megan’s Law.
- Megan’s Law IV / SORNA (effective Dec. 20, 2012) later classified the offense as a Tier II registrable crime requiring 25 years’ registration; Farabaugh sought relief arguing SORNA violated his plea agreement and constitutional rights.
- The trial court denied relief; the Superior Court initially vacated that denial after Act 19 (2014) appeared to exempt 2d‑degree indecent assault, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s statutory interpretation and remanded for consideration of issues preserved on appeal.
- On remand, the Superior Court held Farabaugh was entitled to specific enforcement of his plea: the Commonwealth must honor the non‑registration promise and SORNA registration/reporting may not be imposed against him based on the plea terms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Farabaugh) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea agreement’s non‑registration term must be enforced | The plea explicitly promised a non‑reportable offense; enforcing plea promotes fundamental fairness and the plea’s contractual terms | SORNA changes the law; registration is a collateral consequence not barred from later application | Held: Enforce plea; non‑registration was an enforceable term and the Commonwealth must honor it |
| Whether retroactive application of SORNA to this plea is unconstitutional (facial/as‑applied) | Retroactive application and onerous reporting violate due process, contract clauses, and plea fairness | SORNA is lawful and applies to convictions existing as of its effective date | Court declined to reach constitutional questions, resolving case on non‑constitutional, state‑law plea‑enforcement grounds |
| Whether SORNA is a mere collateral consequence that cannot void plea expectations | Farabaugh: registration was an inducement to plead and not a collateral, insubstantial consequence | Commonwealth: registration is collateral and may be applied despite plea | Held: Registration here was not merely collateral—non‑registration was an express, enforceable term of the bargain |
| Whether issues raised first on appeal (statute of limitations, voluntariness, ineffective counsel) are reviewable | Raised on appeal to assert plea invalidity | Commonwealth: issues waived because not raised below | Held: those issues (statute of limitations; voluntariness; ineffective counsel) are waived for this appeal; may be pursued in a timely PCRA petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (plea bargains are contractual; specific enforcement of plea terms concerning registration is required for fairness)
- Commonwealth v. Nase, 104 A.3d 528 (Pa. Super. 2014) (defendant entitled to benefit of plea bargain when law changes increase registration duties)
- Commonwealth v. Kroh, 654 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. 1995) (plea agreements analyzed under contract law; ambiguities construed against the Commonwealth)
- Commonwealth v. Fruehan, 557 A.2d 1093 (Pa. Super. 1989) (reasonable understanding of parties controls whether plea terms were breached)
- Commonwealth v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259 (Pa. Super. 2009) (plea bargaining is central to criminal justice and must be enforced to preserve system integrity)