Commonwealth v. Earle, 458 Mass. 341

197? offender Margaret Earle convicted in 2005 by jury of second-degree murder for death of 21-month-old daughter (1985); direct appellate review granted.
Evidence centered on whether defendant’s omission to seek medical care showed malice (third prong) or first-prong intent to kill.
Medical and circumstantial evidence showed peritonitis from a severed bowel; timing of trauma and subsequent symptoms documented.
Defense argued insufficiency of malice and requested manslaughter instruction; prosecution argued third-prong malice and omission-based malice.
Court held evidence did not prove third-prong malice beyond a reasonable doubt; reversed conviction and remanded for entry of not guilty; manslaughter was not retried due to statute of limitations.
Court did not resolve whether omission could sustain involuntary manslaughter due to expired limitation period; nonetheless, reversed on sufficiency grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether malice under third prong suffices to prove second-degree murder	Earle argued third prong malice proven by failure to seek care	Earle contends symptoms and observed conditions did not show plain, strong likelihood of death	Insufficient for third-prong malice
Whether omission evidence can satisfy first or third prong malice	Commonwealth asserts omission to treat shows plain likelihood of death	Earle contends no reasonable caretaker would foresee death from observed symptoms	Omission cannot sustain third-prong malice; not enough for any malice prong
Whether first-prong malice (intent to kill) could be inferred	Commonwealth argues inference from conduct and prior injuries supports intent	Earle argues no direct intent to kill; circumstantial evidence insufficient	No substantial evidence of intent to kill
Whether evidence could support involuntary manslaughter instead	Commonwealth argues wanton/reckless conduct appropriate for manslaughter	Court need not reach due to expiration; but evidence would be insufficient for malice	Manslaughter theory not decided on merits; not relied upon due to time limit
Whether the trial record warrants any other malice theory	Commonwealth hints at second-prong malice	No adequate support to sustain second prong under the record	Second-prong malice not established; focus remains on insufficiency of third prong

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671 (1979) (defining Latimore standard for sufficiency of evidence to sustain a guilty verdict)
Commonwealth v. Fickling, 434 Mass. 9 (2001) (plain and strong likelihood of death; used to define murder malice spectrum)
Commonwealth v. Robidoux, 450 Mass. 144 (2007) (deprivation of child as indicators of malice; extreme cases of murder)
Commonwealth v. Michaud, 389 Mass. 491 (1983) (reversed involuntary manslaughter conviction; contrasts with murder standard)
Commonwealth v. Grey, 399 Mass. 469 (1987) (third prong malice—reasonable foreseeability of death)
Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383 (1944) (define high degree of likelihood of substantial harm in reckless contexts)
Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 367 Mass. 743 (1975) (involuntary manslaughter standards in child-care omissions)
Commonwealth v. Russell, 439 Mass. 340 (2003) (limits on proving culpability by failure to seek medical care)
Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659 (1981) (parental duty to care; criminal liability for failure to act)
Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523 (1948) (parental duty and criminal liability for omission)
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 413 Mass. 387 (1992) (related to certain types of involuntary manslaughter)