Commonwealth v. Douglas
472 Mass. 439
| Mass. | 2015Background
- Around 3 A.M., Boston police conducting surveillance followed a car from a nightclub after observing it make turns without signaling; officers stopped the vehicle for the civil motor-vehicle infraction.
- Four occupants: driver (female), front passenger Jason Douglas, and two rear passengers including Wayne Steed; officers knew Douglas had prior firearm convictions and that the group had attended a party tied to a violent rivalry.
- Officers ordered the rear passengers out and pat-frisked them after observing movement and a hand-in-pocket; no weapons were found and the judge found those frisk suspicions dissipated.
- Douglas exited the vehicle unasked, was ordered back inside, then moved the gear shift from "park" to "drive" while the driver kept the brake engaged; officers ordered him out, frisked him (no weapon), then performed a protective sweep and found a loaded firearm under the front passenger seat.
- Superior Court allowed motions to suppress; the Appeals Court reversed; the Supreme Judicial Court granted review and reversed the suppression order (i.e., held the search was lawful) but on narrower grounds tied to Douglas's conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were exit orders and pat-frisks of rear-seat passengers lawful? | Officers had reasonable suspicion based on movements and prior knowledge to order exits and frisk. | Movements were innocuous (e.g., removing seatbelt, hand in pocket) and frisk revealed no weapons; suspicion dissipated. | Even if initially reasonable, suspicion dissipated after negative frisks; protective sweep not justified on that basis. |
| Did negative frisks of rear passengers taint later search of vehicle? | Any earlier suspicion was severed by later events and officer observations; subsequent search could be justified. | Negative frisks eliminated reasonable suspicion and tainted further searches. | Negative frisks dissipated suspicion as to those occupants; court declines to uphold vehicle sweep based solely on those earlier frisks. |
| Did Douglas's conduct (exiting unasked and shifting to "drive") provide reasonable suspicion to frisk him and sweep vehicle? | Douglas's unbidden exit and shifting to "drive," combined with context (party tied to violent rivalry, Douglas's firearm history), justified frisk and limited protective sweep of area he occupied. | The shift back to "park" and lack of observed weapon meant no reasonable belief Douglas was armed or that a vehicle sweep was necessary. | Held for Commonwealth: Douglas's conduct and contextual facts supplied reasonable suspicion that he was armed or that a weapon was within reach; frisk and limited sweep of area under his seat were permissible. |
| Were defendants' procedural defects in suppression affidavits fatal? | Commonwealth argued Rule 13 infirmities warranted denial without hearing. | Defendants relied on merits; hearing occurred. | Commonwealth waived objection by not seeking dismissal prior to hearing; procedural defect not fatal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Santana, 420 Mass. 205 (1995) (traffic stop lawful despite officers' subjective intent)
- Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669 (2001) (limits on ordering occupants from vehicle; need reasonable belief of danger)
- Commonwealth v. Johnson, 454 Mass. 159 (2009) (pat-frisk of vehicle occupant requires reasonable suspicion person is armed and dangerous)
- Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746 (2013) (limited protective search for weapons allowed when officer reasonably suspects danger)
- Commonwealth v. Silva, 366 Mass. 402 (1974) (protective searches for weapons permissible even without probable cause)
- Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136 (1990) (protective sweep must be confined to discovering weapons)
- Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266 (1977) (protective sweep limited to area within suspect's access)
- Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 450 (2002) (intervening acts during stop can remove taint of earlier illegality)
- Commonwealth v. Fredette, 396 Mass. 455 (1985) (circumstances may justify renewed intrusion when officer reasonably perceives threat)
