33 N.E.3d 405
Mass.2015Background
- Defendant Douglas Dossantos was arrested for assault and battery on a family or household member after an incident at his wife's home; no physical injury resulted.
- At arraignment the Commonwealth filed a preliminary written statement under G. L. c. 276, § 56A alleging that domestic abuse occurred immediately prior to or in conjunction with the charged offense; the judge declined to enter a written ruling as § 56A requires and reported a question of law under Mass. R. Crim. P. 34.
- § 56A (2014) requires the prosecutor to file a preliminary written statement when domestic abuse is alleged, requires the judge to make a written ruling that abuse is alleged, and directs that the statement be maintained in the statewide Domestic Violence Record Keeping System (DVRS).
- The preliminary statement in the DVRS is not public or criminal record information and must be removed if a finding of not guilty, no bill, or no probable cause is entered (but not removed on dismissal).
- The reporting judge and defendant argued § 56A forces the judge to rubber-stamp prosecutor allegations and thus violates due process and possibly the separation of powers by ceding fact-finding to the executive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 56A requires only ministerial confirmation by the judge of the prosecutor's allegation before entry into DVRS | Commonwealth: judge's written "ruling" is a ministerial record-keeping act; no independent judicial fact inquiry required | Dossantos: statute compels judicial rubber-stamp of prosecutor allegation, labeling defendant an "abuser" without due process | Court: § 56A requires judge to inquire and be satisfied there is an adequate factual basis for the allegation before making the written ruling (not merely ministerial) |
| Whether § 56A violates due process by permitting entry into DVRS without judicial assessment | Commonwealth: entry is record-keeping with no protectable liberty interest implicated | Dossantos: automatic entry stigmatizes and harms rights across forums; due process requires judicial assessment | Court: avoided deciding facial constitutional claim because statute reasonably read to require preliminary judicial inquiry into factual basis, addressing due process concern |
| Whether § 56A violates separation of powers by shifting fact-finding to executive | Commonwealth: statute allocates administrative reporting and does not usurp judicial function | Dossantos: statute permits executive usurpation of judicial fact-finding | Court: did not reach separation-of-powers claim because its statutory construction (requiring judicial inquiry) obviated need to decide constitutional issue |
| Standard of inquiry required of judge under § 56A | Commonwealth: (implicit) low/ministerial standard sufficient | Dossantos: judge must meaningfully evaluate allegations (implying higher standard) | Court: judge must determine whether proffered facts, if credited, suffice to show "abuse" as defined in G. L. c. 209A § 1; not a probable-cause standard, no hearing required, but record must show the inquiry occurred |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (framework for procedural due process analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Disler, 451 Mass. 216 (Mass. 2008) (statutory interpretation favoring readings that avoid constitutional doubts)
- Staman v. Assessors of Chatham, 351 Mass. 479 (Mass. 1967) (canon: avoid constitutional invalidation if a reasonable construction exists)
- Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153 (Mass. 1997) (background on the DVRS statutory scheme)