57 N.E.3d 987
Mass.2016Background
- In 1986 two men were murdered in Slye Park; Joseph Schindler witnessed the shootings and later identified Frank DiBenedetto as the third shooter; co-defendant Louis Costa and Paul Tanso were implicated by witnesses.
- DiBenedetto was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder after a 1994 retrial; evidence at trial included Schindler's identification, witness Storella's testimony, and phenolphthalein presumptive blood-test results on a pair of Nike sneakers seized from DiBenedetto.
- In 2004/2005 DNA testing of the sneakers (by Hanniman, later confirmed by Carll Ladd) produced weak, mixed DNA profiles from multiple contributors and excluded both victims as sources of the DNA; the DNA testing was not available at trial.
- DiBenedetto moved for a new trial based on newly discovered DNA evidence; a single justice allowed appeal to the full court, which remanded for further findings by the trial/motion judge; on remand the judge held a nonevidentiary hearing and again denied a new trial.
- The Supreme Judicial Court reinstated DiBenedetto’s appeal (holding a second §33E petition unnecessary where a single justice had already allowed review) but affirmed the denial of a new trial, finding the motion judge did not abuse his discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (DiBenedetto) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether reinstatement of the original §33E appeal was required after remand where the court did not expressly retain jurisdiction | The Commonwealth argued a new (second) gatekeeper petition under §33E was required before appeal from the post-remand denial | DiBenedetto argued the single justice’s prior allowance meant the full court retained jurisdiction to decide the originally allowed issue after remand | Court: Reinstatement appropriate; second §33E petition unnecessary because a single justice already found a new and substantial question worthy of full-court review |
| Whether newly discovered DNA evidence entitles defendant to a new trial under Grace test | DNA exclusion of victims is not sufficiently exculpatory to create a substantial risk of a different verdict given strength of identification and other evidence | The DNA excluding victims from sneaker mixtures is powerfully exculpatory and would have undercut the prosecutor’s phenolphthalein/blood evidence and corroboration of eyewitness ID | Court: Denial of new trial affirmed; judge did not abuse discretion—DNA was weak/mixed, storage and degradation issues, and eyewitness ID was strong and central to verdict |
| Whether newly available DNA would have rendered phenolphthalein evidence inadmissible and been a "real factor" in jury deliberations | The Commonwealth maintained phenolphthalein evidence was of marginal consequence compared to eyewitness ID and jury triangulation | DiBenedetto argued DNA would have excluded the victims as sources and undercut prosecutor’s use of presumptive blood testing as corroboration | Court: Even if phenolphthalein evidence would be undermined, it was not a decisive factor; elimination would not create a substantial risk of a different verdict |
| Standard of review for post-trial new-evidence motions where motion judge was trial judge | Commonwealth argued deference appropriate but denied relief based on trial judge’s findings | DiBenedetto argued court should find DNA would likely have changed outcome given issues with eyewitness reliability | Court: Afford substantial deference to trial/motion judge who observed witnesses; review does not show clear error of judgment and decision falls within reasonable alternatives |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 427 Mass. 414 (trial and conviction history) (DiBenedetto II)
- Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 458 Mass. 657 (remand for further findings on DNA new-evidence claim) (DiBenedetto III)
- Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303 (standards for new trial on newly discovered evidence)
- Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607 (application of Grace test where new evidence would render inculpatory trial evidence inadmissible)
- Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340 (substantial-risk standard for whether new evidence would probably have produced a different verdict)