Commonwealth v. DeJesus
468 Mass. 174
| Mass. | 2014Background
- Defendant, a lawful permanent resident who entered the U.S. as a child and lived in Boston, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine (reduced from a trafficking charge carrying a five-year mandatory minimum) and received probation.
- Defense counsel knew the client was noncitizen, told him a guilty plea would make him “eligible for deportation” and that he would “face being deported,” and provided an immigration attorney’s contact; substitute counsel at the plea hearing gave no additional immigration advice.
- After a later arrest, federal immigration authorities detained the defendant and initiated removal proceedings; defendant moved in Superior Court to withdraw his guilty plea.
- The plea judge (who heard the motion) found counsel’s advice constitutionally deficient under Padilla because the conviction made deportation presumptively mandatory, and concluded defendant was prejudiced — vacating the plea and allowing withdrawal.
- Commonwealth appealed; state supreme court affirmed the allowance of the motion to withdraw the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s statement that the plea made the defendant “eligible for deportation” satisfied constitutional duty to advise on immigration consequences | Language from Padilla ("eligible for deportation") suffices; counsel warned defendant he might be deported | Advice was incomplete; counsel should have told defendant deportation would be presumptively mandatory for the charged conviction | Held: Insufficient — counsel’s advice was constitutionally deficient because it failed to convey that removal would be virtually inevitable |
| Whether counsel’s performance fell below professional norms (performance prong) | Counsel reasonably warned client and provided immigration referral; no measurable deficiency | Failure to convey the mandatory nature of removal for an aggravated-felony drug conviction falls below objective standard | Held: Performance prong satisfied; advice was objectively unreasonable |
| Whether defendant demonstrated prejudice from deficient advice (prejudice prong) | The plea (probation) was a good deal; defendant suffered no prejudice warranting withdrawal | Defendant would have pursued motion to suppress and risked trial to avoid deportation; plea calculus materially affected by immigration risk | Held: Prejudice proven — reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial; motion to withdraw plea properly allowed |
| Whether statutory/colloquy warnings substitute for counsel’s obligation | Court’s statutory admonition and waiver form suffice | Judicial admonition is not a substitute for individualized counsel advice about near-certain removal | Held: Judicial warnings are not adequate substitute for counsel’s duty under Padilla |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (Sup. Ct.) (counsel must advise when deportation consequence is clear and virtually automatic)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Sup. Ct.) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard: performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (Sup. Ct.) (standard for prejudice when plea induced by counsel’s errors)
- Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30 (Mass.) (state framework applying Strickland/Hill to plea withdrawal requests)
- Commonwealth v. Sylvain, 466 Mass. 422 (Mass.) (counsel must provide accurate advice on deportation consequences)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (Sup. Ct.) (limits on discretionary relief for aggravated felons)
- United States v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980 (9th Cir.) (defendant entitled to know when removal is a virtual certainty)
- State v. Sandoval, 171 Wash. 2d 163 (Wash.) (advice minimizing deportation risk insufficient when removal is near-certain)