Commonwealth v. Davis
AC 15-P-1088
| Mass. App. Ct. | Jun 2, 2017Background
- Defendant Nasahn Davis was arraigned March 19, 2012 on a charge of carrying a firearm without a license; he filed a Mass. R. Crim. P. 36(b) motion to dismiss on March 31, 2014 (742 days later).
- Rule 36(b) presumes dismissal if trial is not held within 12 months of the return day unless the Commonwealth justifies delay or excluded periods apply.
- Parties agreed 218 days were properly excluded; dispute centered on whether 268 days of court-congestion-related continuances should also be excluded.
- Davis objected at each congestion-related continuance and repeatedly sought the next available trial date; the Commonwealth was generally ready for trial and pushed to proceed.
- Trial court allowed the motion to dismiss; the Appeals Court affirmed, holding court-congestion delays are includable unless (1) the defendant acquiesced/caused/benefited from the delay or (2) the judge made the specific Rule 36(b)(2)(F) findings on the record.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Davis's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether days lost to court congestion and juror unavailability must be excluded from the Rule 36 computation | Congestion days should be excluded when the Commonwealth was ready and not at fault; judges implicitly made sufficient findings | Congestion days are includable when defendant objected and did not acquiesce, cause, or benefit from the delay | Court-congestion delays are included unless defendant acquiesced/caused/benefited or judge made explicit Rule 36(b)(2)(F) findings; here they were included |
| Whether judges may implicitly satisfy Rule 36(b)(2)(F) by explaining juror unavailability | Implicit findings and on-record reasons suffice to exclude delay | Rule 36(b)(2)(F) requires express findings on the record that ends of justice outweigh speedy-trial interest | Explicit findings are required; mere explanation of juror shortage is insufficient to invoke (F) |
| Whether defendant’s prior waiver of the 30‑day rule meant acquiescence to initial scheduling delays | Waiver of the thirty‑day rule implies acquiescence to the full pre-set trial date | Waiver only covers the portion beyond thirty days; initial scheduling does not constitute acquiescence to the whole delay | Waiver only covers delay beyond thirty days; the early portion remains includable |
| Whether defendant benefited from a specific continuance (dismissal of venire) so time should be excluded | The jury dismissal gave Davis the benefit of a new venire, so that continuance favored him | Davis objected to the continuance; benefit cannot override expressed objection | Benefit does not excuse delay when the defendant expressly objected; the period remains includable |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 411 Mass. 503 (1992) (court congestion normally insufficient to justify speedy-trial delay unless defendant agreed)
- Barry v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 285 (1983) (docket and clerk minutes are prima facie evidence; rule 36 balancing of obligations)
- Commonwealth v. Denehy, 466 Mass. 723 (2014) (defendant who did not object to court-imposed continuances is deemed to have acquiesced)
- Commonwealth v. Lauria, 411 Mass. 63 (1991) (defendant’s disinterest/acquiescence can permit denial of Rule 36 relief)
- Commonwealth v. Conefrey, 410 Mass. 1 (1991) (court congestion may be excused when defendant agreed to continuance)
- Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 448 Mass. 538 (2007) (a claimed benefit to a defendant will not justify delay when the defendant expressly objected to the delay)