Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620

Mass. G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a)(v2)(2) criminalizes leaving the scene after knowingly colliding with or causing injury to a person, resulting in death.
The statute’s knowledge element is argued to apply to either colliding with a person or injuring a person, and to both actions.
On December 23, 2009, the defendant struck the victim on Robertson Street; the victim died from blunt force trauma.
The defendant asserted he did not know he collided with a person; his account was deemed credible by the trial judge.
At trial, the judge initially held the burden was only to prove collision with an object; after post-trial proceedings, he entered a judgment of acquittal.
Appellate review held that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant knew he collided with a person or otherwise caused injury.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Knowingly element apply to both collision and injury?	Commonwealth argues knowingly covers both colliding with a person and injuring a person.	McMenimon/Horsfall interpretations suggest knowingly modifies only colliding.	Yes; knowingly modifies both verbs; knowledge required.
Does the adverb knowingly apply to both verbs in the clause?	Commonwealth relies on the adverb applying to both actions.	Legislative history not needed; earlier cases misapplied.	Yes; adverb applies to both colliding and causing injury.
Are older cases (McMenimon, Horsfall) controlling or distinguishable?	They support requiring knowledge of collision with a person.	They involve different statutory text and facts; not apt here.	Not apt; distinguishable and older version of the statute.
What is the ultimate knowledge standard under the statute?	Knowledge that he collided with a person or caused injury is required.	Knowledge of collision with an object suffices?	Knowledge of colliding with a person or causing injury is required.

Foss v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 584 (Mass. 2002) (statutory interpretation: plain meaning governs)
Commonwealth v. Woods Hole, Martha’s Vineyard & Nantucket S.S. Auth., 352 Mass. 617 (Mass. 1967) (words not to be treated as superfluous; plain language guidance)
Commonwealth v. Velasquez, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 697 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (adverb knowingly applies to related elements)
Commonwealth v. McMenimon, 295 Mass. 467 (Mass. 1936) (older version; not apt for current issue)
Commonwealth v. Horsfall, 213 Mass. 232 (Mass. 1913) (older version; distinguishable facts)
Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751 (Mass. 1951) (leaving the scene and information provision context)
Porro v. Commonwealth, 458 Mass. 526 (Mass. 2010) (cases where defendant knew vehicle hit a person)