90 N.E.3d 750
Mass.2018Background
- Victim and defendant began a relationship in 2014; defendant encouraged her to resume prostitution, helped set up Backpage ads (using her photos, alias, email/phone), and collected her cash earnings to buy drugs and alcohol.
- Defendant accompanied the victim to street prostitution, set prices, monitored client calls, and sometimes waited in another room when clients met the victim at a house they used.
- On December 13–14, 2014, after physical assaults (punching, kicking, choking) the defendant forcibly sexually assaulted the victim, threatened her with a switchblade and attempted stabbing; victim later treated at hospital and defendant arrested.
- Indictments included human trafficking (G. L. c. 265, § 50(a)), deriving support from prostitution, rape, and multiple assault counts; jury convicted on human trafficking, deriving support, rape, and two assault and battery counts; acquitted on other counts.
- On appeal the defendant challenged: (1) limitations on defense voir dire about whether jurors would expect an innocent defendant to testify; (2) sufficiency of evidence and jury instruction on the human trafficking statute (whether force/coercion is required); and (3) exclusion/retroactive redaction of Backpage invoices sought for impeachment.
Issues
| Issue | Commonwealth's Argument | Dabney's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voir dire: whether defense could ask jurors if they would expect an innocent defendant to testify | Judge’s form of the question was sufficient; trial judge has discretion over wording and scope of attorney voir dire | Counsel’s question was proper to reveal bias and should have been allowed | No abuse of discretion; judge reasonably excluded counsel’s phrasing as confusing/commitment-question and probative by the judge’s form |
| Sufficiency: whether human trafficking under G. L. c. 265, § 50(a) requires force/coercion | Statute focuses on the perpetrator’s intent; conviction sustainable without proof of force or coercion | Statute requires force or coercion; otherwise too broad/vague and duplicates other prostitution statutes | Evidence sufficient; statute does not require proof of force or coercion; McGhee controls |
| Jury instruction on trafficking: whether instruction should add "enable or cause" language or emphasize specific acts | Judge’s instruction tracked statutory language and McGhee’s explanation; no need for extra phrasing | Proposed wording was necessary for clarity and to limit scope | Instruction adequate; refusal to adopt defendant’s preferred phrasing not error |
| Impeachment: use of Backpage invoices dated after arrest to contradict victim’s denial of reposting | Invoices potentially probative but required proper foundation and explanation; judge can limit confusing evidence | Invoices impeach victim’s testimony about reposting and should be usable without Backpage witness | No abuse of discretion; invoices could not be used to directly impeach without foundation and jury would be confused without a Backpage witness; judge properly limited use and redacted records |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. McGhee, 472 Mass. 405 (2015) (Mass. human trafficking statute focuses on perpetrator's intent; force/coercion not required)
- L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 (2014) (trial judge has discretion to control voir dire wording and scope)
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (adequate voir dire is part of right to an impartial jury)
- Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682 (2015) (trial judges have discretion in framing jury instructions)
- Commonwealth v. Evans, 438 Mass. 142 (2002) (requirements for using documents as prior inconsistent statements for impeachment)
- Commonwealth v. Rosario, 444 Mass. 550 (2005) (trial judge may exclude relevant evidence if probative value is outweighed by risk of confusion or unfair prejudice)