Commonwealth v. Cunningham
622 Pa. 543
| Pa. | 2013Background
- In 1999 a 17-year-old (Appellant) shot and killed Daniel Delarge, Jr.; Appellant was convicted in 2002 of second-degree murder and given mandatory life without parole (LWOP) plus additional consecutive time; judgment became final in 2005.
- Appellant filed a timely post-conviction petition under Pennsylvania’s PCRA claiming his LWOP violated the Eighth Amendment; initial courts denied relief.
- In 2012 the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, holding that mandatory LWOP for offenders under 18 is unconstitutional because it prevents consideration of youth-related mitigating characteristics.
- Appellant argued Miller should apply retroactively to his final judgment on collateral review; the Commonwealth argued Miller is procedural, did not categorically bar LWOP, and was not shown to be retroactive.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied Teague/Summerlin retroactivity principles and concluded Miller announced a new procedural rule (not a substantive rule or watershed procedural rule) and therefore did not apply retroactively to Appellant’s final sentence; the Superior Court’s order was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Miller to collateral cases | Miller is substantive (or at least applied to a collateral defendant in Jackson), so it should apply retroactively to similarly situated prisoners | Miller did not resolve retroactivity; Miller is procedural and courts may bar retroactive application under Teague | Miller is a new procedural rule and is not retroactive to convictions final before Miller; affirmed denial of PCRA relief |
| Substantive vs. procedural character of Miller | Miller alters the class of persons who may receive LWOP (juveniles) and therefore is substantive | Miller mandates a sentencing process (individualized consideration of youth) and does not categorically prohibit LWOP for juveniles, so it is procedural | Court concluded Miller is procedural (it “bans nothing” categorically) and thus falls outside Teague’s substantive exception |
| Applicability of Teague’s "watershed" exception | Miller is so fundamental that it could be a watershed rule warranting retroactivity | Watershed exception is narrowly confined and Miller does not implicate bedrock procedural guarantees affecting accuracy of conviction | Court found Miller not a watershed rule; exception unavailable |
| Appropriate forum/remedy for unfairness to pre-Miller juveniles | Miller should be given state-law retroactivity or relief via PCRA/habeas because unequal treatment is unjust | Relief must follow federal retroactivity doctrine; PCRA requires Supreme Court retroactivity holding before collateral relief under §9545(b)(1)(iii) | Court suggested legislative or state-constitutional avenues may be available but declined to extend Miller retroactively under federal Teague doctrine; affirmed judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (U.S. Supreme Court: mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment because it forecloses consideration of youth)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (U.S. Supreme Court: death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed under age 18)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (U.S. Supreme Court: LWOP unconstitutional for non-homicide juvenile offenders)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (U.S. Supreme Court plurality: new constitutional rules are generally non-retroactive on collateral review, subject to narrow exceptions)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (U.S. Supreme Court: clarified substantive/procedural distinction for retroactivity; substantive rules generally retroactive)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (U.S. Supreme Court: discussed exceptions to non-retroactivity for rules affecting categories of punishment or classes of defendants)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court: addressed implementation of Miller on direct appeal)