Commonwealth v. Cox, R., Aplt.
204 A.3d 371
Pa.2019Background
- Russell Cox was convicted in 1997 of two first‑degree murders and related offenses; jury imposed death sentences after finding multiple aggravating factors. Cox was 18 at the time of the crimes.
- Cox filed a first PCRA; state courts denied relief. He filed a second PCRA asserting (inter alia) an Atkins claim that he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution. The PCRA court dismissed parts of the second petition as untimely but remanded on Atkins after this Court ordered further proceedings.
- Following multi‑year evidentiary hearings (2008–2013), experts and lay witnesses testified about Cox’s IQ testing (WAIS‑R/III scores clustered around 69–78), adaptive functioning (school records, prison behavior, GED attainment), and the potential relevance of the Flynn Effect and SEM to older IQ tests.
- The PCRA court credited the 2005 WAIS‑III score (78) and other evidence of adaptive strengths (GED, prison job, lack of special‑education placement) and rejected earlier lower scores and the SIB‑R results, concluding Cox did not prove intellectual disability. The court dismissed the PCRA petition on the Atkins issue and found remaining claims untimely.
- On appeal, the Commonwealth changed its position and urged that Hall, Brumfield, and Moore require focusing on adaptive deficits and medical diagnostic standards rather than lay perceptions or adaptive strengths; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the PCRA court applied improper considerations (Briseno factors, overemphasis on strengths, discounting SEM/Flynn issues) and vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the existing record consistent with those precedents. The Court affirmed the dismissal of Cox’s other untimely claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cox) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth/PCRA court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cox is intellectually disabled under Atkins (IQ + adaptive deficits + onset <18) | Cox: IQ scores and record evidence of lifelong adaptive deficits satisfy Miller/DSM guidance; SEM and Flynn Effect require consideration; GED and prison adaptation don’t negate deficits | Commonwealth/PCRA: 2005 WAIS‑III (78) within normal range when accounting SEM; earlier tests unreliable; evidence shows adaptive strengths (GED, prison job, no special ed) and lay testimony unreliable | Court: PCRA court used improper considerations (Briseno factors, overemphasis on strengths, discounted SEM/Flynn). Vacated and remanded to reconsider existing record under Hall/Brumfield/Moore guidance. |
| Proper role of Briseno factors, adaptive strengths, and lay testimony | Cox: Briseno factors and focus on strengths are improper; must focus on adaptive deficits and clinical standards | Commonwealth/PCRA: relied on Briseno considerations and adaptive strengths to reject Atkins claim | Held: Moore and related U.S. Sup. Ct. precedents disapproved Briseno‑style factors and overreliance on adaptive strengths; PCRA court erred to that extent. Remand required. |
| Treatment of IQ test reliability: SEM, Flynn Effect, and testing conditions | Cox: older tests and Flynn Effect/SEM can lower effective IQ thresholds; testing conditions and prison stimulation may inflate later scores | Commonwealth/PCRA: favored the most recent WAIS‑III score; treated Flynn Effect adjustment and older test validity skeptically | Held: Court declined to resolve Flynn Effect role here but held PCRA court erred by discounting lower scores based on “other sources of imprecision” (contrary to Moore). Reconsideration on remand required. |
| Timeliness of Cox’s remaining PCRA claims and timeliness exceptions | Cox: Various exceptions (governmental interference, newly discovered facts) apply; hybrid pro se filings show counsel ineffectiveness | Commonwealth: Most claims were available earlier and are untimely; Cox’s hybrid filings do not establish deprivation of counsel or timely exceptions | Held: Court affirmed PCRA court’s dismissal of the remaining claims as untimely; Cox failed to prove applicable exceptions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (Eighth Amendment bars death penalty for intellectually disabled)
- Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (must account for SEM and follow medical diagnostic framework when assessing IQ)
- Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (reaffirmed Hall; evidentiary hearing required where adaptive deficits raised)
- Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (disapproved Briseno factors; require medical standards and caution against reliance on adaptive strengths or lay perceptions)
- Commonwealth v. Miller, 888 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2005) (Pennsylvania’s three‑prong Atkins/Miller test: IQ, adaptive deficits, onset)
- Commonwealth v. Hackett, 99 A.3d 11 (Pa. 2014) (review standard and application of adaptive‑functioning analysis)
- Commonwealth v. Bracey, 117 A.3d 270 (Pa. 2015) (application of diagnostic standards; discussion of Briseno factors)
- Commonwealth v. Williams, 61 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2013) (adaptive deficits focus and evidentiary approaches)
- Commonwealth v. Cox, 863 A.2d 536 (Pa. 2004) (prior appellate history)
