Commonwealth v. Colon
102 A.3d 1033
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2014Background
- Appellant Luis Colon had prior sentences: felony criminal trespass (Sept. 2010) and a PWID guilty plea (Aug. 2011); both carried probation terms and resulted in revocations and back time.
- On Nov. 19, 2011 the court granted early parole conditioned on inpatient mental health/substance-abuse treatment at Eagleville; Colon completed inpatient treatment on Jan. 17, 2012.
- On Jan. 18, 2012 police encountered Lynette Santiago crying, with a bleeding lip, facial scratches, torn clothing, and she immediately told Officer Brown that Colon had punched her; Colon was nearby with fresh injuries.
- Santiago later refused further interview and did not testify at the revocation hearing; Officer Brown testified about her out-of-court identification of Colon.
- The trial court found Colon violated probation (revoking parole/probation), admitted Santiago’s statement as an excited utterance, and sentenced Colon to aggregate 4–12 years’ incarceration.
- On appeal Colon challenged (1) admission of Santiago’s hearsay as not an excited utterance and violative of confrontation rights, (2) insufficiency of evidence for revocation, and (3) excessiveness of the sentence for a technical violation.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Commonwealth / Trial Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Santiago’s out-of-court statements (hearsay / excited utterance) | Officer’s testimony about Santiago was inadmissible hearsay; her statements were not sufficiently spontaneous and were tainted by PCP influence | Statements were spontaneous, made near the event while Santiago was upset and injured; corroborated by Colon’s proximity and injuries, so admissible as excited utterance | Court affirmed admission under excited utterance exception; trial court credibility finding that PCP speculation was unproven was reasonable |
| Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause | Admission of Santiago’s testimonial statement without cross-examination violated Crawford and the Confrontation Clause | Parole/probation revocation hearings are not criminal prosecutions; Crawford does not apply; hearsay permitted if hearsay exception applies or good cause shown for unavailability | Court held Confrontation Clause does not bar admission here; excited utterance finding (and corroboration) satisfied reliability/good-cause standards for revocation proceedings |
| Sufficiency of evidence for probation revocation | Evidence was insufficient to prove a probation violation (only an arrest/charge) | Probation revocation requires preponderance showing that probation was ineffective and defendant engaged in assaultive conduct; officer testimony and corroborating injuries suffice | Court found evidence sufficient by preponderance to revoke probation (revocation standard lower than criminal conviction) |
| Excessiveness of sentence after revocation (discretionary aspects) | Four–twelve years is manifestly excessive, given the violation occurred right after treatment (argued as a technical violation) | Court considered defendant history, prior violent convictions, repeated failed rehabilitations, and need to vindicate court authority; sentence within statutory limits and supported by record | Court affirmed sentence as within discretion and justified under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) grounds (likelihood of future crimes / vindicate authority) |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137 (Pa. 2013) (explaining excited utterance / res gestae reliability factors)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (scope of Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause regarding testimonial hearsay)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (due process protections required at parole/probation revocation hearings)
- Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 969 A.2d 1236 (Pa. Super. 2009) (hearsay admissible at revocation hearings upon showing of good cause)
- Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013) (requirement that reasons for sentence be placed on the record upon resentencing after revocation)