Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 46 N.E.3d 19

Police found defendant and his 11‑year‑old son walking on MBTA railroad tracks; MBTA slowed a train so police could remove them.
Defendant was heavily intoxicated, smelled of alcohol, said he "always walked on the tracks" and that he was "fucked up," and at one point fell between the tracks while holding his son’s hand for balance.
Two criminal counts issued: (1) trespass/walking on railroad tracks (G. L. c. 160, § 218) and (2) reckless endangerment of a child (G. L. c. 265, § 13L).
The District Court judge dismissed the § 13L count, holding the statute requires proof the defendant was subjectively aware of the substantial risk and the application failed to show probable cause of that mental state.
Commonwealth appealed; Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case and reviewed de novo whether § 13L requires subjective awareness and whether the application established probable cause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 13L requires proof of defendant's subjective awareness of the risk	§ 13L adopts common‑law meaning of "wanton or reckless," permitting objective proof (reasonable person standard)	§ 13L’s text ("is aware of and consciously disregards") requires subjective awareness	The statute departs from common law; § 13L requires proof of subjective awareness (actual knowledge)
Whether the complaint/application showed probable cause that the defendant created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury	Facts (walking on tracks with child, intoxication, fall, defendant’s statements) establish both a substantial risk and that defendant was aware	Evidence was insufficient to prove subjective awareness at the probable cause stage	Probable cause was satisfied as to both the substantial risk and that defendant was aware and consciously disregarded it; dismissal vacated
What constitutes a "substantial risk" under § 13L	—	Defendant argued risk was only a possibility, not substantial	A "substantial risk" means a real/strong possibility—more than a mere possibility; walking on tracks with a child (and falling between tracks) met that standard
Standard for reviewing probable cause to issue complaint	—	—	Probable cause requires facts sufficient for a reasonably prudent person to believe offense committed; review is de novo and the threshold is not as demanding as proof beyond a reasonable doubt

Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 250 (discussing judicial finding of probable cause before issuing complaint)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause standard framed as facts sufficient for a reasonable person)
Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169 (probable cause requires more than suspicion but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
Commonwealth v. Levesque, 436 Mass. 443 (common‑law discussion of "wanton or reckless" including objective component)
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 462 Mass. 415 (elements of § 13L defined)
Commonwealth v. Hendricks, 452 Mass. 97 ("substantial risk" requires more than a possibility; disregard must be substantially more than negligence)
Joyce v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 301 Mass. 361 (railroad tracks are inherently dangerous)