Commonwealth v. Claycomb
566 S.W.3d 202
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2018Background
- Kentucky enacted KRS Chapter 216C (Medical Review Panel Act) in 2017, requiring mandatory pre‑suit review of malpractice and malpractice‑related claims by a medical review panel before a claimant may commence court proceedings (with a nine‑month safe harbor if no panel opinion issues).
- The Act applies broadly to health‑care providers and related entities and permits bypass of the panel only by unanimous agreement of the parties or by prior valid arbitration agreement.
- Ezra Claycomb (a minor injured by alleged malpractice) sued, challenging Chapter 216C as unconstitutional; the trial court struck down the Act in full.
- The Commonwealth appealed; the Court of Appeals granted emergency relief, and the Kentucky Supreme Court accepted transfer to decide constitutional issues.
- The Supreme Court focused on Ky. Const. § 14 (open‑courts / remedy guarantee) and held that the Act’s mandatory delay and foreclosure of immediate access to the courts for common‑law personal‑injury claims violates § 14, rendering Chapter 216C unconstitutional in its entirety.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether KRS Ch. 216C violates Ky. Const. § 14 (open courts/remedy) by imposing a mandatory pre‑suit panel delay | Claycomb: mandatory panel delays and the requirement that other parties agree to bypass foreclose immediate access to courts for common‑law personal‑injury claims, violating the constitutional guarantee of remedy without delay | Commonwealth: § 14 historically restrains judiciary, not legislature; procedural prerequisites and reasonable delays are permissible; similar statutes elsewhere upheld | Held: § 14 applies to all branches; Chapter 216C impermissibly delays and forecloses immediate judicial redress for common‑law personal‑injury claims and is void in its entirety |
| Whether § 14 allows a reasonableness test for legislative delays | Claycomb: § 14 plainly proscribes delay; no reasonableness test applies to mandatory pre‑suit foreclosure of court access | Commonwealth: delays that are reasonable or procedural should be allowed; other jurisdictions apply reasonableness | Held: Court rejects a reasonableness inquiry for § 14’s prohibition on delay in this context; delay is proscribed for common‑law claims seeking immediate redress |
| Scope of § 14 as a constraint on the legislature | Claycomb: § 14 is a protection against all branches restricting access to courts | Commonwealth / some scholars: § 14 historically limited to judicial function | Held: § 14, read with § 26, limits all departments of state government from infringing the remedies guarantee |
| Whether alternative dispute resolution or voluntary waiver can satisfy § 14 | Claycomb: involuntary or coerced waiver (when claimant lacks meaningful choice) fails § 14 | Commonwealth: alternative processes may suffice if properly structured | Held: Voluntary, knowing waiver or consensual arbitration/ADR can satisfy § 14, but Chapter 216C’s forced delay and dependence on other parties’ consent means waivers under the Act are not sufficiently voluntary |
Key Cases Cited
- Werner v. Commonwealth, 280 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1955) (discusses judiciary duty to shield citizens when rights invaded and the open‑courts tradition)
- Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932) (seminal Kentucky decision applying open‑courts and jural‑rights doctrines to limit legislative encroachment)
- Tabler v. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1985) (Kentucky case striking special‑legislation limitation on civil actions)
- Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (federal due process holding recognizing states may impose reasonable procedural requirements for adjudication; cited and distinguished on differences from § 14 challenges)