Commonwealth v. Chmiel, D., Aplt.
173 A.3d 617
| Pa. | 2017Background
- David Chmiel was convicted and sentenced to death in 2002; state forensic examiner George Surma testified that hairs found on a sweater-sleeve mask were "microscopically similar" to Chmiel’s hair.
- In 2015 the FBI issued a press release publicly admitting that prior FBI microscopic hair-comparison testimony was erroneous in the vast majority of reviewed cases and that FBI training taught flawed language to state/local examiners.
- Chmiel filed a second PCRA petition (June 18, 2015) invoking the PCRA timeliness exception for "newly discovered facts" (42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)), relying on the FBI press release and contemporaneous Washington Post coverage; he also sought discovery to show whether Surma had FBI training.
- The PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely and previously litigated, relying on precedent (notably Commonwealth v. Edmiston) and press reports predating 2015 that discussed internal FBI/DOJ reviews.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court (majority) reversed, holding the FBI press release disclosed two newly discovered facts (the FBI’s public admission of widespread erroneous testimony, and that the FBI trained state/local analysts in the flawed methods) that were not previously in the public domain and which triggered the 60-day filing window. The case is remanded for merits proceedings and reconsideration of discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Chmiel) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth/PCRA court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the FBI press release qualifies as a "newly discovered fact" under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) | The FBI’s April 20, 2015 press release publicly admitted FBI analysts’ testimony was erroneous in most cases and that FBI training disseminated flawed methodology — facts unknown and not discoverable earlier; petition filed within 60 days. | The substance was already publicly available via earlier reporting and studies (e.g., NAS Report, earlier Washington Post articles); Chmiel could have discovered the issues with due diligence before 2015. | Held: The FBI press release announced new, material facts (public admission and disclosure of FBI training of state/local analysts) that were not public before; it satisfies §9545(b)(1)(ii). |
| Whether Chmiel’s current claim is "previously litigated" (bar under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3)) | The current claim is predicated on the FBI’s new admissions and thus rests on a discrete legal ground distinct from prior Frye/ineffective-counsel claims. | Chmiel previously litigated challenges to hair microscopy (Frye/ineffectiveness); thus the issue is barred as previously litigated. | Held: Not previously litigated — prior PCRA attacked admissibility and counsel performance; the new factual predicate (FBI admission) makes the present claim discrete. |
| Whether the PCRA court erred in denying discovery about whether Surma was trained by the FBI | Discovery is necessary to establish the connection between the FBI admissions and Surma’s testimony; prosecutors control that information and should disclose it. | Commonwealth argued Chmiel had no direct evidence Surma was FBI-trained, so discovery was unwarranted while petition was time-barred. | Held: Remand for proceedings; because the petition is timely under the newly discovered-fact exception, the PCRA court should reconsider the discovery request in light of that conclusion. |
| Standard for evaluating newly-discovered facts vis-à-vis prior scientific critiques (e.g., NAS Report/Edmiston) | The FBI’s public admission by the agency that promoted the technique is qualitatively different from prior scientific critiques or compilations (NAS Report); it triggers the 60-day window. | Prior public critiques (NAS Report and earlier articles) already put claimants on notice; Edmiston controls and defeats timeliness. | Held: Distinguishes Edmiston — the NAS Report compiled existing public critiques but was not an authoritative admission by the agency that promulgated the practice; FBI’s 2015 admission is a new fact. |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 889 A.2d 501 (Pa. 2005) (direct-appeal factual background of convictions)
- Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (Pa. 2011) (prior PCRA litigation addressing Frye/ineffectiveness claims)
- Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013) (analysis of §9545(b)(1)(ii) and NAS Report — public-domain limitation)
- Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (standards for newly discovered facts exception and jurisdictional rules)
- Commonwealth v. Dengler, 586 Pa. 54, 890 A.2d 372 (Pa. 2005) (Frye admissibility framework)
- Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564 (Pa. 2005) (definition of "issue" for previously litigated bar)