Commonwealth v. Chappell
473 Mass. 191
| Mass. | 2015Background
- On Jan. 20, 2011, Stephanie Moulton, a counselor at Seagull House (a residential mental‑health group home), was found murdered; the defendant, a resident, was tried and convicted of first‑degree murder (premeditation) by a jury on Oct. 28, 2013.
- Physical and forensic evidence: victim found in a church parking lot wrapped in a sheet from defendant’s room; one matching boot at the house; fingernail scrapings from defendant yielded a mixed DNA sample with defendant as major contributor and victim included as a possible minor contributor; other swabs excluded defendant.
- Post‑crime conduct: defendant was seen changing clothes, abandoning the victim’s car, attempting to obtain lodging, and made equivocal statements after arrest; he also made a spontaneous remark in custody implicating another person.
- Defendant’s psychiatric history: longstanding schizophrenia with multiple hospitalizations (2006–2009), documented decompensation episodes, and expert defense testimony (Dr. Werner) that defendant was not criminally responsible due to psychosis and auditory command hallucinations prompting the killing.
- Commonwealth’s psychiatric evidence: Dr. Kelly testified defendant was criminally responsible, opining the claimed hallucinations lacked integration into a delusional system and that post‑offense concealment demonstrated capacity to appreciate wrongfulness.
- Procedural posture and issues on appeal: defendant challenges (1) admission of DNA testimony by a substitute expert who did not perform the testing, (2) limits on direct examination of defense mental‑health expert, (3) the Mutina (consequences of verdict) instruction given to the jury, and (4) the scope of a consciousness‑of‑guilt instruction. He also sought relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth) | Defendant's Argument (Chappell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of DNA testimony by substitute expert | Substitute expert supervised and reviewed raw data and could testify; defendant had meaningful cross‑examination | Confrontation clause violated because the testifying expert (Schneeweis) did not perform the underlying testing (Hughes did) | Admitted: expert acted as technical reviewer/second reader, independently reviewed raw data and formed opinions; confrontation right satisfied. |
| Limitation on direct examination of defense psychiatric expert | Rule limiting experts from testifying to contents of out‑of‑court records on direct protects evidentiary balance; records may be admitted if proponent chooses | Excluding testimony about medical records impaired right to present a defense; defendant wanted expert to describe bases of opinion without admitting voluminous records | Affirmed: trial judge properly applied rule (Dept. of Youth Servs./Mass. G. Evid. §703); defense could have admitted records to allow such testimony; exclusion not unconstitutional. |
| Mutina instruction (consequences of NG by reason of lack of criminal responsibility) | Model instruction accurately stated legal consequences; no error | Instruction underestimated potential duration of commitment (did not explicitly say possible lifetime commitment) and may have biased jury | No reversible error; court proposes a revised provisional Mutina instruction that explains initial observation, six‑month commitment and potential for successive annual recommitments up to life if still mentally ill and dangerous. |
| Consciousness‑of‑guilt instruction scope | Evidence of post‑offense acts relevant both to identity/occurrence and to mental state at time of offense | Instruction should have been limited to use for assessing criminal responsibility only | Affirmed: instruction proper; consciousness‑of‑guilt evidence was relevant to whether homicide occurred and to criminal responsibility; limiting instruction not required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Department of Youth Servs. v. A Juvenile, 398 Mass. 516 (1986) (expert may base opinion on facts/data not in evidence but may not testify to their substance on direct examination)
- Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773 (2010) (permitting experts to testify to opinions based on tests by others where meaningful cross‑examination is possible)
- Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580 (2013) (substitute expert testimony permissible where defendant could meaningfully cross‑examine about underlying data)
- Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 Mass. 391 (2014) (error where substitute expert could not be meaningfully cross‑examined because testing occurred at a different lab)
- Commonwealth v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810 (1974) (instructing jury on consequences of verdict of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal responsibility)