Commonwealth v. Champney, 161 A.3d 265

Background

Ronald Champney was detained in county jail on unrelated charges from Oct 1997 and had multiple custodial contacts with PSP Sgt. David Shinskie about the 1992 Bensinger homicide (Nov 25, 1997; Dec 23, 1997; May 13, 1998; Oct 8, 1998).
On Nov 25, 1997, after being asked to come to the barracks to give a statement, Champney said he would have to speak to an attorney; questioning ceased and he was returned to jail.
On Dec 23, 1997, during transport after a preliminary hearing and after Miranda warnings, Champney was asked if he shot Bensinger and said, “Before I make any kind of statement, I think I should talk to Frank Cori.” Shinskie (who knew Cori was an attorney) stopped questioning.
On May 13, 1998 (≈5 months later), Shinskie and another detective met Champney in a prison conference room, gave Miranda warnings, obtained a signed waiver, and Champney made incriminating statements about the murder; those statements were later suppressed by the trial court.
The Commonwealth appealed the suppression of the May 13 statements; the Superior Court panel affirmed but the case was heard en banc where the court reversed suppression, holding (1) Champney clearly invoked his right to counsel on Dec 23, 1997, but (2) Shatzer’s break-in-custody rule allowed re-approach after a sufficient break and a valid Miranda waiver on May 13, 1998.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Commonwealth)	Defendant's Argument (Champney)	Held
Whether Champney’s Dec 23 statement invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel	The phrase “I think I should talk to Frank Cori” was equivocal/ambiguous (similar to Davis) and did not clearly invoke counsel	The statement identified a specific attorney and, in context, was an unambiguous request to consult counsel before speaking	Court held statement was a clear, unambiguous invocation; reasonable officer knowing Cori was an attorney would understand it as a request for counsel
Whether Edwards’s prohibition on re-interrogation without counsel barred May 13, 1998 questioning despite Dec 23 invocation	Even if invocation occurred, Champney remained in custody; under Roberson/Edwards the presumption against re-interrogation should apply	Shatzer means a sufficient break in Miranda/interrogative custody ends Edwards presumption; May 13 was >14 days and Champney returned to ordinary jail routine, so re-approach permitted after fresh Miranda waiver	Court held Shatzer governs: Champney experienced a break in Miranda/interrogative custody and the nearly five-month interval (plus valid waiver) made the May 13 statements admissible
Whether May 13 waiver was knowing and voluntary	N/A (Commonwealth argued waiver was valid)	Waiver was limited to arson questioning or not knowing as to homicide; waiver involuntary due to custodial pressure	Court found waiver valid and voluntary; Champney waived any narrower-subject argument by failing to develop it in court and on appeal

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right to counsel during custodial interrogation)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (after invocation of right to counsel, police may not reinitiate interrogation absent counsel or suspect-initiated communication)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (invocation of counsel must be clear and unambiguous; ambiguous references do not require cessation of questioning)
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) (Edwards presumption ends after a break in Miranda/interrogative custody of sufficient duration; Court identified 14-day benchmark)
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012) (incarceration alone does not automatically create Miranda custody; examine totality of circumstances)
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (Edwards bars reinterrogation about any crime while suspect remains in custodial interrogation)
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (once counsel has been requested, police may not question suspect absent counsel even after suspect consults with counsel)
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991) (Edwards presumption applies irrespective of whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment right has attached)