Commonwealth v. Caetano
26 N.E.3d 688
Mass.2015Background
- Defendant Jaime Caetano was arrested after police found an operational stun gun in her purse during a supermarket parking lot encounter; she said it was for self‑defense against an abusive ex‑boyfriend.
- She was charged under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 131J, which broadly prohibits private possession of electrical incapacitating devices.
- At a bench trial the parties stipulated the device was a stun gun regulated by § 131J; the judge found her guilty and placed the case on file (later preserved for appeal).
- Caetano moved to dismiss pretrial, arguing the Second Amendment (as interpreted in Heller and McDonald) protects possession of stun guns for self‑defense. The trial court denied the motion.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review to decide whether the Massachusetts ban on stun guns violates the Second Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Caetano's Argument | Commonwealth's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Second Amendment protects possession of stun guns for self‑defense | Stun guns are "arms" in common use for self‑defense and thus fall within Heller/McDonald protection | Stun guns are modern, "dangerous and unusual" weapons not protected by the Second Amendment | Stun guns are not protected; statute constitutional |
| Whether the ban burdens the Second Amendment "core" (self‑defense in the home) | Possession for self‑defense should be protected even if used outside a traditional home context; homelessness may still qualify as a "home" | The conduct occurred outside the home (in a vehicle) and the "core" protects defense in the home | Conduct was outside the core; court did not extend Heller to stun guns outside the home |
| Whether stun guns are "dangerous and unusual" or "in common use" at founding | Stun guns are commonly used today for lawful self‑defense, thus presumptively protected | Stun guns are modern inventions (post‑founding), unusual, and designed to incapacitate (dangerous per se) | Stun guns are modern, not in common use at founding, and dangerous per se; thus outside Second Amendment protection |
| Whether the statutory ban survives rational‑basis review if Second Amendment does not apply | (Not fully articulated by Caetano) — argued need to defend oneself | The Legislature rationally may ban devices that incapacitate, injure, or kill and that are hard to detect; public safety objective supports ban | Ban passes rational‑basis review under federal and state constitutions |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess firearms for self‑defense in the home; right is not unlimited)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment right recognized in Heller applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment)
- United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (Second Amendment protects weapons in common use for lawful purposes; weapons not typically possessed by law‑abiding citizens for lawful purposes need not be protected)
- Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296 (1980) (common‑law distinction between weapons dangerous per se and tools used as weapons)
- Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232 (2013) (Heller established that possession of operative firearms for defense of the home is the core of the Second Amendment)
- Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432 (1975) (defendant may appeal a conviction placed on file in certain circumstances)